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PERSONS WHO ARE NOT THE PEOPLE: THE
CHANGING RIGHTS OF IMMIGRANTS IN
THE UNITED STATES

Geoffrey Heeren*
Abstract
Non-citizens have fared best in recent Supreme Court cases by
piggybacking on federal rights when the actions of states are at issue,
or by criticizing agency rationality when federal action is at issue.
These two themes-federalism and agency skepticism-have proven in
recent years to be more effective litigation frameworks than some
individual rights-based theories like equal protection. This marks a
substantialshift from the Burger Court era, when similar cases were
more likely to be litigated and won on equal protection than on
preemption or Administrative Procedure Act theories. This Article
describes this shift, considers the reasons for it, and makes a
normative argument that the change is a cause for concern. To make
this claim, the Article sets out a theoretical framework of rights of
personhood and membership, offers a history of immigrant rights, and
suggests that the shift away from equal protection as a mode of
analysis might reflect a decreased willingness to recognize non-citizens
as members of civil society. The Article critiques this shift as
inconsistent with democratic values.

*
Assistant Professor, Valparaiso University Law School. I would like to
thank Heidi Altman, Aaron Caplan, Rosalie Berger Levinson, Hiroshi Motomura,
Andrew Schoenholtz, Philip Schrag, and Bernard Trujillo for their thoughtful
comments on the article.
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I. INTRODUCTION
As the Supreme Court recently debated the fate of
Arizona's effort to crack down on unauthorized immigration,
protestors gathered in the sun-drenched space between the Capitol
and the Supreme Court. On the left (facing away from the Court,
toward the Capitol), protestors chanted, "el pueblo unido jamds serd
vencido"-the people united will never be defeated.1 On the right, a
protestor held a sign with a simple rejoinder: "We Are a Nation of
USA Citizens."2
The two slogans raise competing claims about who is entitled
to concern and respect in the United States. The sign implied a nation
of citizens owes nothing to non-citizens. On the other hand, a united
"people" might be composed of more than just citizens; it could
include persons with other types of connections to the United States,
or it could even refer, in the sense of left-wing politics, to the
proletariat. Both, in other words, might be communitarian slogans,
with each defining community differently. Read another way, the
chant might also be staking a liberal claim--"the people" could simply
be all persons, every one of whom is entitled to core freedoms. 3
Each of these readings reflects a different view about the
scope of American rights. Do rights in this country belong to all
persons or just to members, and if the latter, who are the rightsbearing members? Inside the Court, the Justices were also concerned
about rights, but not individual ones. They considered the proper
balance of state and federal rights-whether Arizona's enforcement
regime was preempted by federal authority over immigration.
In another era, the Court might have concerned itself more
closely with the questions of individual rights invoked by the
protestors than the structural questions at the heart of Arizona v.

1.
See Natalie Camastra, My Day at the Supreme Court Rallying
Against SB1070,
Nuestra
Vida,
Nuestra
Voz
(Apr.
25,
2012),
http://latinainstitute.wordpress.com2012/04/25/my-day-at-the-supreme-courtrallying-against-sb1070/.
2.
Dana Milbank, On Immigration Case, Scalia Throws Fair,Impartial to
the Wind, Wash. Post, Apr. 26, 2012, at A2.
3.
For a description of the debate between communitarianism and
liberalism, see Michael J. Sandel, Introduction, in Liberalism and Its Critics 1, 5
(Michael J. Sandel ed., 1984). In essence, liberals of both the classical and modem
variety take as a given that individuals have rights, and society exists to protect
those rights. Communitarians flip this analysis, urging that rights and values
have meaning only through the shared experience of members of a community.
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United States. In 1982, for example, the Court considered both
preemption and equal protection claims in Plyler v. Doe, a case in
which Texas had attempted to cut off education for undocumented
immigrant children.4 The Court never addressed the preemption
issue; it resolved the case on equal protection grounds.'
The Equal Protection Clause was enacted within the
Fourteenth Amendment, a provision designed to remedy the
subordination of slaves by guaranteeing both universal citizenship to
persons born in the United States and equal protection of the law to
all persons. In the same breath, it speaks of two types of rights:
membership and personhood.6 Its text goes to the heart of the debate
outside the Supreme Court as Arizona was argued within-the
promise and limitation of American rights. Yet Arizona did not
address the Fourteenth Amendment.7 One obvious explanation was
that the federal government plaintiff was more preoccupied with its
own rights than the rights of non-citizens. However, Arizona ought to
be considered alongside a trend in which immigrant equal protection
claims are less likely to be argued today than they were during the
Plyler era.
In the 1970s and 1980s, the Court applied equal protection
review to strike down a variety of legislation discriminating against
non-citizens.8 It seemed for a time that non-citizens' equal protection
rights were robust, at least in the context of constitutional claims
that did not concern the federal government's power to exclude or
deport them.9 But in the years since, the once sharp contours of the

Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 208-09 (1982) (explaining that the District
4.
Court ruled favorably on both the plaintiffs' equal protection and preemption
arguments; the Fifth Circuit upheld the equal protection claim but reversed
on preemption).
Id. at 230.
5.
U.S. Const. amend. X1V, § 1 (providing both that individuals "born or
6.
naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are
citizens of the United States" and that all persons are entitled to equal protection
of the law).
See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012).
7.
See Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216 (1984); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202
8.
(1982); Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977); Examining Bd. of Engineers,
Architects and Surveyors v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572 (1976); In re Griffiths,
413 U.S. 717 (1973); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973); Graham v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
Scholars have distinguished between immigration and "alienage" cases,
9.
which involve the rights of non-citizens outside the context of citizenship,
deportation and exclusion. See Linda Bosniak, The Citizen and the Alien 54
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Court's equal protection analysis for non-citizens have begun to blur
and even fade; the Court hasn't decided an equal protection case in
favor of an immigrant in decades, the lower courts increasingly reject
such claims, and litigators now avoid making them. ' ° In another
recent case, Judulang v. Holder, the Court reprised an equal
protection issue resolved by the Second Circuit in 1976, but dealt
with it instead on Administrative Procedure Act (APA) grounds. 1 The
prior term, a majority of the Court couldn't agree on an appropriate
analysis for an equal protection challenge to a citizenship provision,
meaning the Court affirmed the lower court decision without issuing
an opinion."
The change is by no means complete-substantial exceptions
can be found where the lower courts have upheld immigrants' equal
protection claims,13 and several important Supreme Court decisions
in the past decades have affirmed immigrant rights other than
equal protection.14 Nonetheless, it is impossible to consider the
Burger Court's decisions concerning immigrants and immigration
alongside those of recent years without concluding that there has
been a change.
The Court's immigration decisions from the past term show
that non-citizens can still win federal cases. Arizona teaches that
preemption theory is one way for non-citizens to win before the
contemporary court. Judulang, where the Court ruled in the
non-citizen's favor on APA grounds, is another good example of a
successful strategy. Just as Arizona was preceded by a series of lower

(2006). The Burger Court's principal equal protection decisions were all alienage
cases. One explanation for the Court's divergent treatment of alienage and
immigration cases is the "plenary power" doctrine, which precludes courts to a
large extent from reviewing substantive constitutional claims in the immigration
law context. See Hiroshi Motomura, The Curious Evolution of Immigration Law:
ProceduralSurrogates for Substantive Constitutional Rights, 92 Colum. L. Rev.
1625, 1627 (1992).
10.
See infra Part II.D.
11.
Judulang v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 476 (2011).
12.
Flores-Villar v. United States, 131 S.Ct. 2312 (2011).
13.
See Hispanic Interest Coal. of Ala. v. Governor of Ala., No. 11-14535,
2012 WL 3553613 (11th Cir. Aug. 20, 2012); Dandamudi v. Tisch, 686 F.3d 66, 79
(2d Cir. 2012).
14.
See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 699-700 (2001) (indefinite
detention of non-citizens would violate their right to due process); Padilla v.
Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1486 (2010) (failure to advise non-citizens of the
deportation consequences of criminal convictions would violate their Sixth
Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel).
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court decisions finding state and local anti-immigrant laws to be
preempted, Judulang can be viewed as part of a larger landscape of
federal court decisions criticizing the irrationality of agency action.
For example, Judge Richard Posner of the Seventh Circuit
has spearheaded a crusade against the Board of Immigration Appeals
(the Board) and its lack of real oversight of an overworked and
sometimes sloppy corps of immigration judges. In the process of doing
so, he has authored a corpus of decisions that has significantly
altered the face of immigration law and made himself into one of the
most widely discussed jurists in immigration practice and
scholarship.1" Yet examination of a decade's worth of Judge Posner's
immigration law decisions reveals that this pro-immigrant judge
rarely ever mentions non-citizen's rights.16 Instead, he scathingly
criticizes the competence of the immigration agency-its adjudicators,
laws and regulations, and bureaucratic machinery. 7
These decisions teach that if an immigration lawyer wants to
win an immigration appeal, she should not argue that her client has
rights; she should assert that the immigration judge is incompetent,
the Board indifferent, the bureaucracy inefficient, and the regulations
irrational. Immigrants are the beneficiaries more than the subjects of
these decisions. There is, to be sure, a rights principle implicit in
them: the right to a fair procedure. This recognition of immigrants'
procedural rights is consistent with other recent case law upholding
immigrants' procedural rights in criminal cases or cases involving the
quasi-criminal area of immigration detention. 8
The administrative law, criminal procedure, and detention
involve rights claims in a traditional Lockeian sense-claims
all
cases
for freedom from heavy-handed governmental action. In contrast,
when immigrants make communitarian claims for equal treatmenta share in the privileges and benefits of citizenship-their claims are
increasingly rejected. In order to see this shift, it is necessary to
understand the breadth of membership rights that immigrants in the

See, e.g., Adam B. Cox, Deference, Delegation,and ImmigrationLaw, 74
15.
U. Chi. L. Rev. 1671 (2007) (considering two possible bases for Judge Posner's
skepticism of the immigration agency: nondelegation principles or a concern with
institutional competence).
See infra Part II.
16.
See Cox, supra note 15 at 1679-182.
17.
See supra note 14. For a general discussion of the tendency of courts to
18.
rely on procedural due process as a surrogate for substantive constitutional
rights, see Motomura, supra note 9, at 1656-79.
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United States have historically possessed. Until the early twentieth
century, some states granted state citizenship rights, including
voting, to immigrants, particularly "declarant aliens" who had filed
"first papers" stating their intention to naturalize.19 This no doubt
stemmed from a national consensus that immigrants (at least
European ones) were future citizens.2"
The equal protection decisions of the Burger Court can be
situated within this larger context of immigrant membership rights.
The Burger Court upheld immigrant equal protection challenges to
restrictions on licensing, education, financial aid, bar admission, and
state welfare benefits-all perks of the type that we tend to associate
with membership.2 1 The exact contours of "membership rights" versus
"rights of personhood" are fuzzy, and, no doubt, constantly shifting.
At one time, for example, it was assumed that work was a natural
right, but now non-citizens' ability to work is sharply regulated.22
Even the sanctified American right of free speech does not necessarily
belong today to all non-citizens. In a recent D.C. District Court panel
decision that the Supreme Court affirmed without opinion, the court
held that non-lawful permanent residents' ability to contribute funds
to political candidates is unprotected by the First Amendment.2 3
Viewed within this framework, the receptivity of federal
courts to claims criticizing the immigration bureaucracy seems like it
might have very little to do with immigrant rights. In fact, one reason
the narrative of bureaucratic incompetence might work so well is that
it taps into popular disaffection with the government's immigration
enforcement policies. For decades now, the anti-immigrant right
has decried the government's failure to enforce immigration laws
in the face of a so-called "invasion" or "flood" of "illegal aliens.""
Conversely, on the left, immigrant advocates have criticized

19.
See Jamin B. Raskin, Legal Aliens, Local Citizens: The Historical,
Constitutional and Theoretical Meanings of Alien Suffrage, 141 U. Pa. L. Rev.
1391, 1399-1416 (1993).
20.
See Hiroshi Motomura, Americans in Waiting: The Lost Story of
Immigration and Citizenship in the United States 115-25 (2006).
21.
See supra note 8.
22.
See infra Part II.B.2.
23.
Bluman v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 800 F. Supp. 2d 281, 288 (D.D.C.
2011), affd 132 S.Ct. 1087 (2012).
24.
See Peter H. Schuck, Citizens, Strangers, and In-Betweens: Essays on
Immigration and Citizenship 183 (1998).
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draconian immigration enforcement. 25 The former Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) and its successor, Department of
Homeland Security (DHS), are agencies with few supporters and
many enemies; as a result, it has become dogma that DHS is a
bureaucratic bungler, charged with sober responsibilities that it
uniformly botches. Conservative judges who have been trained to be
suspicious of governmental regulation can readily reverse the agency
on the ground that it is irrational or incompetent without drawing
popular ire over their incidental support for the one constituency even
less popular than governmental bureaucracies: immigrants.
The thesis of this Article is that immigrants do not
necessarily gain when their opponents lose. Although courts are
willing to enforce the federal government's power to preempt state
immigration law and to deeply probe the rationality of immigration
decisions, they are less likely to concede what was once a given-that
immigrants are largely entitled to equal treatment. Today
non-citizens are balkanized into a host of hierarchical categories, and
even the Lawful Permanent Residents (LPRs) at the top cannot lay
claim to many of the rights of membership that "declarant aliens"
enjoyed during an earlier era. Instead, non-citizens now get
reasonable treatment, or when they are lucky, the noblesse oblige of
the Executive. But without substantial and durable rights, they
cannot adequately defend the benefits they receive or effectively
attack federal programs that hurt them.
Consider two recent Obama Administration initiatives, one
that benefits non-citizens, another that hurts them. First, the
Administration has a new program for granting Deferred Action to
Childhood Arrivals (DACA). Essentially, deferred action is a reprieve
from deportation for immigrant youths who would benefit from a
repeatedly filed but never passed bill called the Development, Relief,
and Education for Alien Minors (DREAM) Act.26 Second, the
Administration has aggressively pursued removal of "criminal aliens"
through the Secure Communities program, which facilitates the

25.
See, e.g., Editorial, No Exit From a Bad Program,N.Y. Times, Feb. 28,
2011, at A22 (criticizing the Secure Communities enforcement initiative, which
mandates that state and local law enforcement agencies cooperate with the
federal government to deport immigrants with criminal cases).
26.
See Julia Preston and John Cushman, Jr., Obama to Permit Young
Migrants to Remain in U.S., N.Y. Times, June 16, 2012, at Al; Julia Preston,
Young Immigrants, In America Illegally, Line Up for Reprieve, N.Y. Times, Aug.
14, 2012, at A8.
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deportation of non-citizens apprehended by states and localities.27
Immigrant advocates have cheered the DACA initiative, but sharply
criticized Secure Communities, which they say often subjects longterm residents to deportation for minor traffic infractions. Some
states and localities have been sympathetic to these arguments, and
localities such as the District of Columbia, Santa Clara County, San
Francisco County, and Cook County (Chicago) have all obstructed
federal efforts by refusing to comply with DHS detainers for some
non-citizens held in criminal detention. 8
The same principles that allowed non-citizens to prevail in
Arizona and Judulang might be used to defend Secure Communities
and to strike down the DACA initiative. DACA was promulgated
without
Congressional
authorization,
public
comment
or
participation, or a record of a reasoned decision-making process in
which the Agency considered arguments against the initiative as well
as those in favor of it. Moreover, the same principles that allowed the
federal government to preempt anti-immigrant legislation in Arizona
might also justify preemption of local efforts to resist Secure
Communities. Thus, federalism and agency skepticism are tenuous
proxies for non-citizen rights. In a way, they are even subordinating
proxies: preemption analysis affirms the power of the federal
government over non-citizens, and the APA is, in large part, an
instrument for assuring agencies' accountability to majoritarian
preferences, which are often hostile to non-citizens.
This Article contends that rights matter. While agency
skepticism and federalism are intriguing tools for non-citizens to
appeal to conservative judges, they are poor substitutes for individual
rights like equal protection. Part I gives a brief historical overview of
the rights of immigrants in the United States, explaining how, at
various times, immigrants have enjoyed both rights of personhood
and rights that we typically associate with membership. Part II
describes the shift away from a jurisprudence of immigrant
membership rights to one focused on the rights and responsibilities of
the federal government and its agencies. Part III sets out some
potential reasons for this shift, including the sharpening of APA
"arbitrary and capricious" review, a broad-based anti-regulatory

27.
See supra note 25.
28.
See Mihir Zaveri, In D.C., No Warm Welcome for Immigration
Crackdown, Wash. Post, June 6, 2012, at B1; Lornet Turnbull, 3 King County
Officials Balk at ICE Detainer Program, Seattle Times (May 9, 2012),
http://seattletimes.com/htm]llocalnews/2018167885_scomm09m.html.
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movement sanctioned by academic doctrines like Public Choice theory
and the Law and Economics movement, and the transference of antiimmigrant sentiment to the agency that regulates immigrants. Part
IV argues that something important has been lost in this transition,
since the surrogates for individual rights that courts have
increasingly come to rely on may not always adequately protect noncitizens. Part V expands on this theme, urging that rights matter to
non-citizens because of their prestige and power to protect and matter
to everyone else because the equitable distribution of rights is a
prerequisite for a just society.
II. A SHORT HISTORY OF IMMIGRANT RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES
This nation was seemingly founded on the idea that all
persons enjoy core rights of "life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness."" In the years since, Americans have come to little
consensus about what these rights mean; scholars cannot even seem
to agree on the value of rights.3 ° Regardless of how much Americans
debate the content of their rights, it is clear that the promise of the
Declaration of Independence-that all persons have core freedoms-is
one that resonates. Thus, U.S. courts have long agreed that
non-citizens are entitled to certain basic rights, like the right to
equal protection.31
Yet if the Declaration of Independence begins by referencing
universal human rights, the Constitution starts by reference to a
select club of rights-holding members. In the Preamble, it is "the
People" who "secure the blessings of liberty" to themselves and their

The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
29.
For a defense and explication of rights, see Ronald Dworkin, Taking
30.
Rights Seriously xi, 269 (1977) (defining a right as a "political trump" held by an
individual so that a collective goal cannot override it). For a communitarian
critique of the "atomistic" notion that rights can have primacy over community,
see Charles Taylor, Philosophy and the Human Sciences 187-210 (1985). For
a critique of rights from the Marxian standpoint of the early Critical
Legal Studies movement, see Mark Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 Tex. L. Rev.
1363, 1363-64 (1984) (arguing that rights are unstable, indeterminate, reifying,
and reactionary).
See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886) (holding that an
31.
ordinance prohibiting laundries made of wood that was discriminatorily applied to
deny laundry licenses to Chinese nationals violated the Equal Protection Clause).
For further discussion of the development of equal protection doctrine in alienage
cases, see infra Part III.A.
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"posterity."32 And it was quite clear at the time that "the People"
did not include all persons within the territory of the United
States; many of the drafters owned slaves whose liberty they
forcefully restricted.
From the beginning, there was a fierce debate about whether
non-citizens were part of "the People." Concerned about the
importation of dangerous revolutionary ideas from France, the lateeighteenth-century Congress passed a series of anti-immigrant
measures known today as the "Alien Acts."33 In debates over these
measures, Federalists argued that all rights stemmed from the
Constitution, which was a kind of compact between citizens; thus,
only citizens could assert rights.34 In contrast, the Jeffersonian
Republicans argued that the Constitution referred to persons, not
citizens, and that all persons were therefore entitled to constitutional
protections.35 The Republicans also based their arguments on theories
of natural rights, human rights, and "mutuality of obligation"--the
notion that because immigrants were subject to U.S. law, they were
also entitled to invoke the protection of the Constitution.3"
In the years since, U.S. courts have teetered between these
two arguments, ultimately coming to rest at a wobbly compromise
between
the
two.
For
example,
everybody
supposedly
has a general right of free expression, but only some people have
a right to express their opinions through voting.37 The former
right comes from a view about individual autonomy that pervades our

32.

U.S. Const. pmbl.

33.
There were three laws making up what are commonly referred to as the
"Alien Acts." See An Act to Establish an Uniform Rule of Naturalization
[Naturalization Act], ch. 54, 1 Stat. 566 (1798) (repealed 1802); An Act Concerning
Aliens [Alien Friends Act], ch. 58, 1 Stat. 570 (1798) (expired 1800); and An Act
Respecting Alien Enemies [Alien Enemy Act], ch. 66, 1 Stat. 577 (1798) (current
version as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 21-24 (2006)). One controversial provision of
the Alien Friends Act authorized the president to issue ex parte orders of
deportation against any resident alien suspected of being "dangerous to the peace
and safety of the United States." § 1, 1 Stat. at 570-71.
34.
Gerald L. Neuman, Strangers to the Constitution: Immigrants,
Borders, and Fundamental Law 54 (1996).
35.
Id. at 54, 57.
36.
Id. at 57-60.
37.
Compare Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 161 (1945) (holding that all
persons in the United States, including aliens, are entitled to the First
Amendment right of free expression) with Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 441
(1992) ("[Tlhe right to vote is the right to participate in an electoral process that is
necessarily structured to maintain the integrity of the democratic system.").
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legal system; the latter from our structure of government. It
might therefore be said that there are two types of rights in
the United States today: rights that belong to every person and rights
that belong to "the People" who are members of our political system.
Relatedly, there are two potential sources of rights: personhood and
polity.
The implications and philosophical roots of these two rights
paradigms-personhood and membership-will be explored in Part V.
For now it is enough to note that they have each impacted the rights
of non-citizens. There are two important points that are necessary to
understand how these two paradigms have played out. First, courts
are more likely to respect non-citizens' membership rights in certain
contexts than in others. Second, non-citizens' legal status has
influenced their rights of membership and even personhood.
The context in which courts are least likely to uphold
immigrants' membership rights is in deportation and exclusion cases,
3
because of something called the "plenary power" doctrine. " The story
of plenary power begins with Chae Chan Ping v. United States, or the
"Chinese Exclusion Case."39 In Chae Chan Ping, the Supreme Court
refused to address the country's discriminatory bar on the admission
of Chinese immigrants, even in the case of an excluded Chinese
°
resident who had previously been granted the right to re-enter. The
Court's justification was that it would generally defer to the political
branches of government when it comes to the exclusion or deportation
of non-citizens, since they have plenary power in the area of foreign
relations. Over the years, the Court has frequently relied on this

See Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of
38.
Plenary Congressional Power, 1984 Sup. Ct. Rev. 255, 255 (defining "plenary
power" as the Supreme Court's refusal "to review federal immigration statutes for
compliance with substantive constitutional restraints"). In addition to
immigration, the federal government has exercised similar plenary power over its
territories and relations with Native Americans. The fundamental characteristics
of plenary power in all three contexts, according to one recent commentary, are
that the authority is inferred from sovereignty rather than based in the
constitutional text, the Constitution imposes few restraints on its exercise, and its
implementation is largely insulated from judicial review. See Sarah H. Cleveland,
Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, and the Nineteenth
Century Originsof Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs, 81 Tex. L. Rev. 1, 8 (2002).
Chae Chan Ping v. United States (Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S.
39.
581 (1889).
Id. at 609.
40.
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doctrine to support judicial non-intervention in cases involving the
removal of non-citizens.4 1
However, in cases outside the context of exclusion and
deportation (sometimes called "alienage" cases), the Court has
affirmed that immigrants enjoy a host of rights.4 2 The boundaries of
immigrants' rights are fluid, but at times, non-citizens have enjoyed
not only rights of personhood, but considerable membership rights.43
The allocation of these rights has been complicated by distinctions
between different classes of non-citizens-a set of distinctions that
has grown increasingly complex and legalistic as immigration law has
evolved. Occasionally, these distinctions have even filtered into
courts' analyses of rights that historically all persons in the United
States have possessed, meaning that non-citizens' basic rights of
personhood have sometimes been contested. The remainder of this
section will consider some of the individual rights that non-citizens in
the United States have possessed.
A. Voting
Today when non-citizens vote they face harsh penalties,44 but
in the early years of the Republic, newly minted states commonly
allowed alien inhabitants to vote in local, state, and federal
elections.45 After the War of 1812, the practice of alien voting slowed
somewhat, but grew again in the mid-nineteenth century as states
increasingly followed Wisconsin's lead in allowing "declarant aliens"
to vote.
Until 1952, the law required non-citizens seeking eventual
naturalization to file "first papers," indicating an intention to

41.

Id.

42.
Bosniak, supra note 9, at 54.
43.
Linda S. Bosniak, Exclusion and Membership: The Dual Identity of
the Undocumented Worker Under United States Law, 1988 Wis. L. Rev. 955,

977-79 (1988).

44.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(10)(D) (2006).
45.
See Raskin, supra note 19, at 1402-03 (discussing the grant of alien
suffrage by particular American states at the turn of the nineteenth century); see
also Motomura, supra note 20, at 116-19 (discussing the history of voting rights
for "intending citizens," those who had filed a declaration of intent to naturalize);
Neuman, supra note 34, at 63-71 (surveying history of alien suffrage in the
United States).
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naturalize. 46 This declaration of intent could be made at any point
after arrival, did not deprive the non-citizen of his original
nationality, did not legally obligate him to complete the process of
becoming a citizen, and did not even require an oath of allegiance to
the United States.47 Nonetheless, it became increasingly common
during the nineteenth century for states to allow declarant aliens
to vote.4" The alien suffrage movement accelerated after the Civil
War, when many states granted declarant aliens who had fought
49
in the Civil War the right to vote. By World War I, however, a
rapid decline had begun, and by 1926 all states had outlawed
alien suffrage."0
B. Military Service
Non-citizens have long enjoyed (or suffered, depending on how
you look at it) the right of military service. During the Civil War,
5
nearly twenty-five percent of the combatants were foreign-born.
Pursuant to the Enrollment Act of March 3, 1863, men between the
ages of twenty and forty-five "of foreign birth who shall have declared
52
on oath their intention to become citizens" were subject to the draft.
After the Civil War, non-citizen combatants were entitled to military
pension benefits and appear to have sometimes received them even
after having left the United States to return to their countries of
origin. 3 However, empirical research suggests that, as a practical
matter, non-citizens had less access to pension benefits than citizens
54
and were rewarded less on average than native recruits.
Non-citizens continued to be subject to conscription up until it
was abolished in 1973," 5 and to this day most non-citizens in the US
(including undocumented aliens) must register for the selective

See Nationality Act of 1940, ch. 876, § 331, 54 Stat. 1137, 1153 (1940)
46.
(codified at 8 U.S.C. § 731 (1946) (repealed 1952)).
Neuman, supra note 34, at 65.
47.
Raskin, supra note 19, at 1407-08.
48.
Id. at 1414-15.
49.
Id. at 1416.
50.
John W. Chambers II, To Raise an Army: The Draft Comes to Modern
51.
America 49 (1987).
Enrollment Act, ch. 75, 12 Stat. 731 (1863).
52.
Ella Lonn, Foreigners in the Union Army and Navy 613 (1951).
53.
Peter Blanck & Chen Song, "With Malice Toward None; with Charity
54.
Toward All": Civil War Pensions for Native and Foreign-Born Union Army
Veterans, 11 Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. 1, 39 (2001).
Schuck, supra note 24, at 169.
55.
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service.56 Today non-citizens remain an important part of the United
States' volunteer military, and there are special provisions of
immigration law designed to facilitate citizenship for non-citizens
who serve in the military.5 7
C. Public Benefits
Since the origins of welfare programs, non-citizens have
received certain public benefits, although their right to do so is
equivocal. On one hand, the jurisprudential high-water mark for
immigrant equal protection arose in a challenge to state restrictions
on immigrant access to welfare benefits. In Graham v. Richardson,
the Supreme Court held that lawful immigrants are a "suspect" class
that has been subjected to historical mistreatment. Thus, the Court
found that state laws discriminating against lawful immigrants
should be subjected to heightened scrutiny, and that Arizona
and Pennsylvania's discriminatory state welfare codes failed to meet
59
this test.
However, in Mathews v. Diaz the Court backtracked, holding
that the federal government had discretion to withhold medical
benefits from refugees that it provided to lawful permanent residents
(LPRs) who had lived in the United States for at least five years.6"
With little judicial brake on benefit restriction, the trend since
Mathews has been towards limiting immigrant access to benefits. The
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of
199661 restricted even lawful immigrants' access to Medicaid, Social
Security, and cash welfare benefits.6 2
Taken together, Graham and Mathews appear to set out a
spectrum of membership rights, with the status of the immigrant and
identity of the discriminator being the relevant factors. In Graham,

56.
See 50 U.S.C. app. § 453 (2006).
57.
See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1440 (2006) (providing route to citizenship for
veterans of foreign wars); see also Margaret Stock, Immigration Law and the
Military (2012) (analyzing the effects of immigration and citizenship law on U.S.
military personnel).
58.
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971).
59.
Id. at 376.
60.
Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 84-85 (1976).
61.
Pub. L. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105.
62.
See generally Raquel Aldana, On Rights, Federal Citizenship, and the
"Alien," 46 Washburn L.J. 263, 272-73 (2007) (outlining the effects of Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act on lawful immigrants).
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the discriminators were states; in Mathews, it was the federal
government, with its plenary power over immigration. In Graham,
the challengers were LPRs; in Mathews, two refugees and one LPR.
The holding of Graham-thatalienage is a suspect class-has mostly
been limited in the years since to cases involving LPRs subject to
state discrimination.6
D. Education
The traditionally state realm of education is an area where
non-citizens have enjoyed substantial membership rights. Nyquist v.
Mauclet involved a relatively straightforward application of Graham:
the plaintiffs were lawful permanent residents challenging a New
York state rule that limited higher education funding to citizens,
64
persons intending to become citizens, or refugees. The Supreme
Court found that that the rule triggered strict scrutiny and struck
it down. 5
A more difficult question arose in Plyer v. Doe, which
6
concerned the rights of undocumented children to education. The
Court stopped short of applying strict scrutiny, acknowledging that

Since Graham the Supreme Court has only twice indicated that federal
63.
discrimination against non-citizens could violate the Equal Protection Clause. The
first was Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, where the Court considered the
constitutionality of a United States Civil Service Commission ban on the
employment on resident aliens. 426 U.S. 88, 90 (1976). The Court recognized in
Hampton that federal discrimination can trigger equal protection review, but held
that equal protection review is more limited where federal, rather than state,
action is at issue, and the federal government advances "overriding national
interests." Id. at 100-01. Nonetheless, the Court ruled in favor of the non-citizen
on due process grounds, holding that "[wihen the Federal Government asserts an
overriding national interest as justification for a discriminatory rule which would
violate the Equal Protection Clause if adopted by a State, due process requires
that there be a legitimate basis for presuming that the rule was actually intended
to serve that interest." Id. at 103. The second case was Examining Board of
Engineers, Architects & Surveyors v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572 (1976), where
the Court struck down a statute enacted by the Puerto Rican legislature that
restricted the ability of non-citizens to practice engineering in the territory. The
Court declined to answer the question whether the statute implicated equal
protection review under the Fifth Amendment because federal action was at issue,
or under the Fourteenth Amendment, which governs state action, but found that
the statute would be invalid under either analysis. Id. at 601.
Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1977).
64.
Id. at 11-12.
65.
Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
66.
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the children's unauthorized status merited different treatment from
the lawful immigrants in Graham.67 Instead, it applied a kind of
intermediate scrutiny, ultimately finding that Texas's effort to cut off
education for unauthorized migrant children was unconstitutional.6"
The Court's finding that Texas's law violated equal protection is
probably an outlier, unlikely to be repeated outside the unique
context of an important right like education and sympathetic
child plaintiffs.6 9
E. Work
Early Supreme Court cases upheld immigrants' right to
work in the face of state restrictions, relying heavily on the logic
and rhetoric of natural rights. In Yick Wo v. Hopkins, the Court
struck down a San Francisco ordinance prohibiting unlicensed
laundry establishments constructed of wood-an ordinance that was
selectively enforced by the city to close down laundries owned by
Chinese persons.7" In finding that San Francisco had violated Yick
Wo's constitutional right to equal protection, the Court undertook a
relatively lengthy discussion of natural rights, including the right to
make a living without being subject to "the mere will of another."7'
The Court instructed that in the American system, "sovereignty itself
remains with the people, by whom and for whom all government
exists and acts."72 Yet the Court stressed that the questions before it
"are to be treated as involving the rights of every citizen of the United
States equally with those of the strangers and aliens who now invoke
the jurisdiction of the court."73 For the Court in Yick Wo, "the people"
were not just the citizens of the United States; they were all persons,
who enjoyed a natural right to work.
The Court returned to this theme of inalienable rights early
in the twentieth century. In Truax v. Raich, the Court struck down
an Arizona law prohibiting the employment of more than a certain
allotment of non-citizens.74 According to the Court, the "right to work

67.
Id. at 220.
68.
Id. at 223-24.
69.
See Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Outside the Law, 108 Colum. L.
Rev. 2037, 2075-76 (2008).
70.
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886).
71.
Id. at 369-70.
72.
Id. at 370.
73.
Id. at 369.
74.
Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915).
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for a living in the common occupations of the community is of the very
essence of the personal freedom and opportunity that it was the
purpose of the Amendment to secure."75 At the time, it seemed that
work had become well-established as a right of personhood.
In the years since, it has become far less clear that
non-citizens have a protected right to work. States may bar
immigrants from employment in jobs with a "governmental
8
function," s such as state elective office,77 the state police, public
0
school teachers, 79 and deputy probation officers." The Court's
rationale in these cases relies heavily on the theory of membership
rights: such persons "perform functions that go to the heart of
representative government."" Moreover, it is unquestionable that the
2
federal government can regulate non-citizen employment, and noncitizens who work in violation of these rules cannot seek the same
remedies for workplace violations as citizens.8 3 In some cases, states
can regulate non-citizens' employment too. States are preempted by
proper
without
working
criminalizing
from
law
federal
documentation, 4 but they can suspend or revoke the licenses of
businesses that fail to comply with federal requirements, as long as
5
the state scheme tracks the federal one closely enough. Today, work
is a right reserved for members of the U.S. system-citizens and
certain privileged immigrants.

Id. at 41.
75.
Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 75 (1979).
76.
Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 647 (1973).
77.
Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978).
78.
Ambach, 441 U.S. at 80-81.
79.
Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432 (1982).
80.
Sugarman, 413 U.S. at 647.
81.
See 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12 (2012) (setting out the classes of aliens
82.
authorized to accept employment); see generally Juan Carlos Linares, Hired
Hands Needed: The Impact of Globalization and Human Rights Law on Migrant
Workers in the United States, 34 Denv. J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 321, 329-37 (2006)
(surveying restrictions, under U.S. guest worker programs, on migrant laborers
seeking new employment).
See, e.g., Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137,
83.
151-52 (2002) (holding that federal immigration statute prohibits awarding of
back pay to unauthorized migrant as a remedy for his discharge in violation of
labor law).
Arizona v. United States, 132 S.Ct. 2492, 2503-05 (2012).
84.

85.

Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S.Ct. 1968, 1986 (2011).
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F. Property
The early-twentieth-century Supreme Court accepted in
Truax that the right to work is a basic attribute of personhood, but
treated real property like a membership right. In Terrace v.
Thompson, 6 the Court held that the state of Washington could
prohibit non-declarant aliens from owning real property. The Court
found it rational to distinguish between declarant and non-declarant
aliens, citing declarant aliens' former voting rights and their
obligation to serve in the military. 7 Ultimately, the Court was
unswayed by the fact that this rule disproportionately affected Asian
Americans, who were ineligible to naturalize.8 " It acknowledged the
natural rights analysis of Truax, but claimed that the right to own
property was less universal than the right to work: "The quality and
allegiance of those who own, occupy and use the farm lands within its
borders are matters of highest importance and affect the safety and
power of the state itself." 9
To this day, alien land restrictions persist in twenty-nine
states.9" When courts have struck down such laws, it has typically
been because they restrict citizens' ability to transfer land, not
because of immigrants' rights. 9' Although the persistence of
antiquated alien land laws may have more to do with inertia than
their post-Graham constitutionality, a new class of restrictions on
non-citizen property rights has lately gained currency. Increasingly,
localities and states have adopted restrictions on leasing land to
unauthorized immigrants;92 in a number of cases, courts have found
these restrictions to be preempted by federal immigration law.93
Thus, immigrants have won these cases not as rights holders on their
own, but by asserting that they are third party beneficiaries of federal
rights. Non-citizen property rights have always been qualified at best,

86.
Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197 (1923).
87.
Id. at 218-19.
88.
Id. at 220.
89.
Id. at 221.
90.
Allison Brownell Tirres, Property Outliers: Non-Citizens, Property
Rights and State Power, 27 Geo. Immigr. L.J. (forthcoming 2013), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2166312.
91.
See Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948).
92.
See Tirres, supra note 90.
93.
See Lozano v. Hazleton, 620 F.3d 170, 225 (3d Cir. 2010), vacated, 131
S. Ct. 2958 (2011) (for further consideration in light of Chamber of Commerce v.
Whiting); Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, 675 F.3d 802,
814 (5th Cir. 2012), reh'g en banc granted, 688 F.3d 801 (5th Cir. 2012).
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and have prevailed when packaged with citizens' property rights or
the rights of the federal government.
G. Speech
The text of the First Amendment bars Congress from passing
any law abridging free speech without limitation as to the status of
the speaker.94 The Supreme Court has interpreted this language to
protect a variety of expressive activity beyond pure speech, from
artistic expression to association and advertising, to name just a
few.95 In the early twentieth century, the Court occasionally seemed
to employ a weaker form of First Amendment scrutiny in cases
96
proceedings.
involving non-citizens in deportation and exclusion
However, by mid-century, the Court stated unequivocally that
"[fireedom of speech and of press is accorded [to] aliens residing in
this country."97 Thus, in Bridges v. Wixon, the Court found that the
First Amendment protected the former communist affiliation of the
9
Australian labor organizer, Harry Bridges. " Although in Harisiades
v. Shaughnessy the Court later rejected a broad First Amendment
99
challenge to the statute that made Bridges deportable, it nowhere
stated in its decision that non-citizens have lesser First Amendment
rights than citizens. °°
Contemporary decisions cast some doubt on Bridges's holding
that non-citizens enjoy full First Amendment protection. In Reno v.
American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, the Court rejected a
selective enforcement claim raised by members of the Popular Front

U.S. Const. amend. I. The 14th Amendment prevents states from
94.
First Amendment; it incorporates many of the earlier provisions of
the
violating
the Bill of Rights and bars states from violating them. See Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
See, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 428 (1963) (association);
95.
Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748, 762 (1976) (commercial speech); Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360
U.S. 684 (1959) (film licensing).
See Maryam Kamali Miyamoto, The First Amendment After Reno v.
96.
American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee: A Different Bill of Rights for
Aliens?, 35 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 183, 193-95 (2000).
Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 145, 148 (1945) (citing Bridges v. California,
97.
314 U.S. 252 (1941)).
Id. at 147.
98.
Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 592 (1952).
99.
See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Federal Regulation of Aliens and the
100.
Constitution,83 Am. J. Int'l L. 862, 869 (1989).
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for the Liberation of Palestine, who contended that the government
had singled them out because of their affiliation with an unpopular
group.' The Court found that it lacked jurisdiction to assess their
claim, but nonetheless opined that where the Government has a
legitimate reason to deport an unauthorized immigrant, "[Tihe
Government does not offend the Constitution by deporting him for the
additional reason that it believes him to be a member of an
organization that supports terrorist activity.""°2 The implication of
American-Arab Anti -Discrimination Committee is that non-citizens
without lawful status might be entitled to less First Amendment
protection than lawful residents.
This was essentially the holding of a D.C. District Court panel
in Bluman v. Federal Election Commission.1°3 In Bluman, the court
considered a provision of the McCain-Feingold campaign finance
reform law barring non-citizens other than lawful permanent
residents from making campaign contributions. 0 4 The court read
Harisiades as support for the proposition "that aliens' First
Amendment rights might be less robust than those of citizens in
certain discrete areas."'' 5 It then relied on the political participation
line of cases to find that "[it is fundamental to the definition of our
national political community that foreign citizens do not have a
constitutional right to participate in, and thus may be excluded from,
activities of democratic self-government."' 0 6 Although the court
purported to apply strict scrutiny to the provision, it rejected
arguments that it was seriously over- and under-inclusive as to its
alleged purpose of limiting foreign influence over American politics."0 '
Ultimately, the court was convinced that LPRs enjoy a special place
in the American polity that justified affording them what it
considered a membership right.

101.

Reno

v.

Am.-Arab

Anti-Discrimination

Comm.,

525

U.S.

471,

487-88 (1999).
102.
Id. at 491-92.
103.

Bluman v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 800 F. Supp. 2d 281, 288 (D.D.C.

2011) (holding that "the United States has a compelling interest for purposes of
First Amendment analysis in limiting the participation of foreign citizens in
activities of American democratic self-government, and in thereby preventing
foreign influence over the U.S. political process."), affd, 132 S. Ct. 1087 (2012).
104.
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, 2 U.S.C. § 441e(a) (2006).
105.
Bluman, 800 F. Supp. 2d at 287.

106.

Id. at 288.

107.

Id. at 290.
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The Supreme Court affirmed Bluman last term without
comment, thus avoiding the messy task of distinguishing Bluman
from Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, where it had
found that corporations have a free speech right that insulates them
8
Corporate
from governmental regulation of their contributions.'"
Amendment
First
of
arena
this
in
rights
more
non-persons now have
law than non-citizen persons. The justification for this departure can
only be that the courts have found campaign contributions to be a
membership right and that corporations are members, but noncitizens other than LPRs are not.
H. Criminal Procedural Rights
In Wong Wing v. United States, the Supreme Court held that
a Chinese national could not be summarily sentenced to one year of
hard labor as a punishment for being in the United States
unlawfully.1" 9 The Court affirmed that non-citizens are entitled to due
process, which prevented imposition of an "infamous punishment"
1 1°
Since then, courts have
without indictment and trial by jury.
assumed that "regardless of alienage, those who stand charged with
crimes within the United States are protected by the Fourth, Fifth,
and Sixth Amendments in proceedings overseen by Article III judges
1
and adjudicated by grand juries and jury trials." ' Indeed, the
Court's most discussed immigrant rights decision in the last few
years is in the area of criminal procedure: in Padilla v. Kentucky, the
Court held that the failure of a defense attorney to advise his client of
the immigration consequences of a guilty plea could constitute
ineffective assistance, in violation of the Sixth Amendment right
to counsel. 2
procedural
enjoyment of core criminal
Non-citizens'
protections does not mean that they are on equal footing with citizens
in criminal cases. Rather, at the ground level, the intersection of the
immigration and criminal enforcement regimes operates in a variety
113
Moreover, one of the most
of ways to disadvantage non-citizens.

Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010).
108.
Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 237 (1896).
109.
Id.
110.
Ingrid V. Eagly, Prosecuting Immigration, 104 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1281,
111.
1292-93 (2010).
Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1486 (2010).
112.
See Eagly, supra note 111, at 1304-19; Gabriel J. Chin, Illegal Entry
113.
As Crime, Deportation As Punishment: Immigration Status and the Criminal
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basic criminal procedural rights-the Fourth Amendment protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures-is qualified for noncitizens. For many years, the Court assumed that non-citizens were
covered to the same extent as citizens.1 14 However, in VerdugoUrquidez v. INS the Court held that the Fourth Amendment did not
apply to a search by American authorities of the Mexican residence of
a Mexican citizen. 1 ' Verdugo-Urquidez's Mexican home had been
raided by American authorities after he was transported by Mexican
police to the United States for prosecution.116 Confronted with the fact
that the Fourth Amendment applies, on its face, to "the People," the
Court engaged in some gymnastics to find Mr. Verdugo-Urquidez
outside its protection:
"'[Tihe people' protected by the Fourth Amendment,
and by the First and Second Amendments, and to
whom rights and powers are reserved in the Ninth
and Tenth Amendments, refers to a class of persons
who are part of a national community or who have
otherwise developed sufficient connection with this
country to be considered part of that community."" 7
For the first time, the Court seemed to be saying that the
Fourth Amendment, long considered a basic right of personhood, was
a membership right, restricted to persons with "sufficient connection"
to the United States. This wasn't the first time the Court had held
that "the people" is a term of art. In the now infamous Dred Scott
case," ' Justice Taney found that the words "people of the United
States" and "citizens" were synonymous terms: "They both describe

Process, 58 UCLA L. Rev. 1417, 1423-33 (2011). The simultaneous advancement
of criminal and deportation proceedings can mean that in practice, non-citizens
get the lowest common denominator for procedural rights. For example, although
in a criminal case, non-citizens would generally be entitled like all defendants to
release on bond, many non-citizens are subject to mandatory detention in removal
proceedings, meaning that even when they are released from state criminal
custody, they can still end up in federal criminal custody. Eagly, supra note 111,
at 1306. This dynamic plays out in several other procedural areas: Miranda
warnings, search and seizure, and sentencing. Id. at 1308-19.
114.
See Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 273 (1973).
115.
Verdugo-Urquidez v. INS, 494 U.S. 259, 274-75 (1990).
116.
Id. at 262.
117.
Id. at 265. See also United States v. Esparza-Mendoza, 265 F. Supp.
2d 1254, 1271 (D. Utah 2003) (holding that "previously deported alien felons" are
unprotected by the Fourth Amendment, since they are not part of "the People"),
affd on othergrounds, 386 F.3d 953 (10th Cir. 2004).
118.
Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
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the political body who, according to our republican institutions, form
the sovereignty, and who hold the power and conduct the government
119
Since African Americans were not
through their representatives."
"had no rights which the white
they
"people,"
this
of
part
originally
12 °
and Dred Scott both
Verdugo-Urquidez
respect."
to
man is bound
outsiders.
of
putative
rights
the
limit
to
logic
use communitarian
I. Due Process
It has been clear since Wong Wing that non-citizens are
entitled to due process. However, Wong Wing involved a criminal
punishment for being unlawfully in the United States; in cases
since, the Supreme Court has been careful to insist that deportation
Thus, the protections discussed above
is not a criminal punishment.'
for non-citizens in criminal proceedings do not necessarily apply
in removal proceedings. For example, in INS v. Lopez-Mendoza,
exclusionary rule does not apply to
the Court held that 1the
22
deportation proceedings.
Overall, the Court has been ambivalent about non-citizens'
due process rights in removal proceedings, relying at times on the
plenary power doctrine to abdicate any meaningful review."' This is
particularly the case for non-citizens who are considered to be seeking
admission to the United States. The Immigration and Nationality Act
has separate grounds of removal for persons in the United States who
are "deportable" and for those outside, seeking admission, who are
24
charged as "inadmissible."

Id. at 404.
119.
Id. at 407.
120.
See Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 147 (1945); INS v. Lopez121.
Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1039 (1984).
Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1050. But see Bustos-Torres v. INS, 898
122.
F.2d 1053, 1057 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that illegally coerced statements cannot
be used in deportation proceedings under the Fifth Amendment Due Process
Clause); Matter of Garcia, 17 I&N Dec. 319, 321 (BIA 1980) (same).
See Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 210
123.
(1953); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 588-89 (1952); United States ex
rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 543 (1950); Fong Yue Ting v. United
States, 149 U.S. 698, 705-06 (1893); Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S.
651, 659 (1892).
Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (2006) (grounds of inadmissibility, which
124.
until 1998 were called the grounds of "excludability") with 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (2006)
(grounds of deportability).
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In the nineteenth century case Nishimura Ekiu v. United
States, the Court said that for persons seeking admission, "the
decisions of executive or administrative officers, acting within powers
expressly conferred by congress, are due process of law."" 5
Historically, this distinction has elevated form over substance, since
persons who have been in the United States for years can still be
considered applicants for admission, as long as they have not been
formerly granted admission. During the Cold War, for example, the
Court upheld the indefinite detention at Ellis Island of a twenty-five
year resident of the United States who could not be deported back to
his native Romania, and who had been excluded upon his attempted
re-entry to the United States based on secret evidence, without
having received a hearing.126
In contrast, the Court has long held that persons admitted to
the United States, at least, must receive due process before being
deported. In Yamataya v. Fisher, the Court held that due process
barred arbitrary deportations, and entitled non-citizens in
deportation cases to an "opportunity to be heard upon the questions
involving his right to be and remain in the United States."127
Eventually, the Court held that lawful permanent residents of the
United States must receive due process even when they are in
exclusion proceedings.128
At times, the Court has been willing to engage in a searching
review of the level of due process in removal proceedings.12 9 It has
held that the Government bears the burden to establish alienage and
deportability by "clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence.""0

125.
Nishimura Ekiu, 142 U.S. at 660. Similarly, during the Cold War, the
Court upheld a procedure that denied a hearing to non-citizens excluded based on
secret evidence, stating, "[wihatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is
due process as far as an alien denied entry is concerned." Ex rel. Knauff, 338 U.S.
at 544.
126.
Ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. at 212-16.
127.
Kaoru Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86, 101 (1903). However, the due
process that Yamataya received was minimal; the Court was unswayed by the fact
that she did not understand English, the language used to conduct the
deportation proceedings. Id. at 102. Any hearing at all, it seemed, would have
satisfied the Court's minimal threshold for due process in Yamataya.
128.
Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 37 (1982).
129.
See, e.g., Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 156 (1945) (reversing a
removal order obtained based on unsigned, unsworn hearsay statements).
130.
Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 277 (1966). However, in cases in which
the non-citizen is an arriving alien, the respondent in proceedings bears the
burden of proof. See 8 C.F.R. § 1240.8(b) (2012).
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Moreover, the Court has made clear that even persons ordered
deported are entitled to due process. In Zadvydas v. Davis, the Court
held that immigrants cannot be held indefinitely if they cannot be
deported.' Under Zadvydas, immigrant detainees must receive some
process to regularly evaluate the likelihood of their removal, and if
in the reasonably foreseeable future, they
they cannot be removed
32
must be released.
Zadvydas stands out as one of the Court's two most
significant decisions in favor of immigrants' constitutional rights
since the Burger Court, 33 the other being Padilla v. Kentucky."3 The
two decisions indicate that the Court is still willing to enforce
immigrants' basic rights of personhood in the context of criminal
procedure and the quasi-criminal arena of detention.
III. AN EROSION OF IMMIGRANT RIGHTS
The above discussion reveals that the entitlement of
immigrants to rights in this country has never been a clear-cut issue.
Whether immigrants are entitled to rights has always depended on
what right is at issue, and where the immigrant stands in the
hierarchy of migrants. From the beginning, courts considered some
rights to be rights of personhood belonging to everyone. Other rights
were associated with membership, and courts have been more likely
to afford these to immigrants who were perceived to be members.
Over time, there have been some important changes in this
calculus. First, the type of immigrants who are considered to be
members has shifted. At one time, any European immigrant who had
expressed an intention to naturalize was arguably a member. Today,
persons must satisfy rigid legal requirements in order to achieve
something close to membership-formal LPR status. Second, the
scope of membership rights available to non-citizen members has

Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 699-700 (2001). Although the Court
131.
has held that the indefinite detention of non-citizens with removal orders would
raise serious constitutional issues, it has rejected the claim that the mandatory
detention of persons in removal proceedings violates due process. See Demore v.
Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 531 (2003).
Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 699-700.
132.
Zadvydas relied on a theory of constitutional avoidance to interpret
133.
the immigration detention statute narrowly so as to not authorize indefinite
detention if removal is not reasonably foreseeable. Id. at 689-99.
Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010).
134.
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changed: today even LPRs cannot assert certain membership rights,
like voting. Third, the boundary between rights of membership and
personhood has shifted so that some rights formerly considered to
belong to all persons, like work, now belong only to members. Fourth,
when given the choice between an individual rights-based claim and
an alternative theory, courts increasingly decide cases on the
alternative theory. Taken together, these changes suggest that there
has been some erosion of immigrant rights.
A. Stricter Membership Rules
Membership is an elastic concept. The preeminent form of
membership in the United States is citizenship, yet at various times
at least some non-citizens have shared in many of the privileges and
rights that we tend to associate with membership. Courts have used
various tests of membership for allocating rights, including entry,
"substantial connection" to the United States, admission as a "lawful
permanent resident," and intent to naturalize.13 5 In general, the
immigrants who have fared best have been those deemed to be on a
136
pathway to citizenship.
As discussed above, declarant aliens could often vote and
serve in the military. Today the law continues in many ways to
privilege persons on a pathway to citizenship. The clearest way of
doing so now is by becoming an LPR. After five years (three years if
married to a citizen), an LPR can naturalize.' 37 LPRs are privileged
over persons with other immigration statuses in countless ways, from
their ability to work and travel, 138 to their ability to access

135.
See Verdugo-Urquidez v. INS, 494 U.S. 259, 270, 272 (1990)
(suggesting that constitutional protections like the Fourth Amendment apply to
aliens with a "substantial connection" to the United States); Landon v. Plasencia,
459 U.S. 21, 33 (1982) (holding LPRs are entitled to due process in exclusion
proceedings); Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197, 218-21 (1923) (finding that the
intention of an alien to become an American citizen was a permissible basis for
regulating alien property ownership); Kaoru Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86, 101
(1903) (holding due process entitles persons who have entered the United States
to a hearing prior to deportation).
136.
See Motomura, supra note 20, at 119-23.
137.
8 U.S.C. §§ 1427(a), 1430(a) (2006).
138.
See Nancy Morawetz, The Invisible Border: Restrictions on Short-Term
Travel by Noncitizens, 21 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 201, 205 (2007).
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property
government-subsidized student loans 139 and legal aid, 140 own
4
1
14
in some states, ' and make political campaign donations.
The primary difference between then and now is that in the
nineteenth and early twentieth century, European migrants could
place themselves in the category of future citizens with a simple
43
expression of intent to naturalize. Today the pathway to citizenship
is circumscribed by rigid legal processes: "adjustment of status" or
"consular processing," which are the means for acquiring a green card
inside or outside the United States, respectively. In contrast to the
relatively straightforward filing of first papers by nineteenth and
early twentieth century declarant aliens, green card applicants today
must navigate an obstacle course of bureaucratic hoops: a preliminary
petition filed by an employer or family member, a long wait for the
relevant "visa category" to "become current," the payment of multiple
costly fees, the gathering of biometric data, a medical examination,
the filing of a lengthy application along with various affidavits and,
in some cases, additional supplementary forms, depending upon
what bars and grounds of inadmissibility the applicant has
history.144
unwittingly triggered over the course of her immigration
On top of all this, applicants may be required to attend an interview
1 45
who may scrutinize their most
with an immigration official
personal relationships.
At one time, virtually any European non-citizen could share
in a wide range of membership rights, especially if the individual had
filed first papers. Today, LPRs who have run a bureaucratic gauntlet
are the closest thing to non-citizen members. As the ministerial and
substantive requirements for adjustment of status and consular
processing tighten, it has become more difficult than ever before to
become a non-citizen member.

See 34 C.F.R. § 668.33(a)(2)(i) (2012) (setting forth the immigration
139.
requirements for participants in a student financial assistance program
authorized by Title IV of the Higher Education Act of 1965).
See Geoffrey Heeren, Illegal Aid: Legal Assistance to Immigrants in
140.
the United States, 33 Cardozo L. Rev. 619, 624-25 (2011).
See Tirres, supra note 90.
141.
See 2 U.S.C. § 441e (2006) (prohibiting foreign nationals other than
142.
LPRs from making campaign donations).
Motomura, supra note 20, at 115-16.
143.
See 8 C.F.R. § 1245.2 (2012) (application for adjustment of status); 8
144.
C.F.R. § 1245.5 (2012) (application for medical examination).
See 8 C.F.R. § 1245.6 (2012).
145.
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B. Narrowing Membership Rights for Non-Citizens
There are some rights that are restricted today to citizens
that were formerly available to at least some non-citizen immigrants.
The most prominent instance is voting, which was commonly allowed
to declarant aliens up until the early twentieth century.146 But there
are other examples of the declining membership rights of non-citizens
who have achieved quasi-member status. For example, 1996
welfare reforms limited the ability of LPRs to obtain federal
147
welfare benefits.

During the Burger Court era, equal protection jurisprudence
provided a relatively sturdy backstop for the rights of LPRs. During
the 1970s and 1980s, the Court struck down a variety of state laws
that limited lawful immigrants' access to the type of privileges and
services that we tend to associate with membership, such as
occupational licensing, welfare, and education.14 However, the Court
drew the line at cases involving some political function, such as state
elective office positions, the state police, public school teachers,
and deputy probation officers. 4 9 In these cases, the Court approved
of states' efforts to limit LPRs' ability to participate in aspects of
civil society.
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,
non-citizens who were considered en route to citizenship enjoyed
rights that were relatively coterminous with those of citizens.1 5 °
Today, LPRs-the closest thing to non-citizen "members"-are
limited from voting, receiving certain public benefits, and serving in
positions with a "political function." It is not only more difficult for a
non-citizen to become a member of civil society today; there are
certain rights of citizenship that non-citizens will never enjoy.

146.
See supra Part I.A.
147.
"Qualified aliens" like LPRs can now only receive food stamps and
Medicaid if they have resided in the United States for five years, unless they have
worked in the United States for 40 qualifying quarters or entered the United
States prior to 1996. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 at §§ 1612-13 (1996).
148.
See supra note 8.
149.
See Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 647 (1973); Ambach v.
Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 73-75 (1979); Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 300 (1978);
Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432, 447 (1982).
150.
See supra Part L.A-B.
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C. Narrowing Rights of Personhood
Courts have long recognized that regardless of their legal
status, non-citizens have core rights of personhood in the United
States. The Supreme Court's relatively recent rulings in Padilla v.
Kentucky and Zadvydas v. Davis reaffirm that even the least popular
immigrants-so-called "criminal aliens"-are entitled to powerful
procedural protections like the right to counsel in criminal cases and
the right to review of their civil immigration detention."' For the
most part, non-citizens' procedural rights are robust. Indeed, if there
is a bright spot in the contemporary Court's immigrant rights
jurisprudence, it seems to be procedural rights in criminal and quasicriminal contexts.
Yet even in the area of criminal procedure, membership can
matter. Verdugo-Urquidez provides that the Fourth Amendmentonce assumed to apply to every person-may not apply to non-citizens
2
who lack a substantial connection to the United States." In civil law,
there are more examples of areas where rights that were once
assumed to belong to all persons are now substantially qualified. At
the time of Yick Wo and Truax, work seemed like a fundamental right
that ought to belong to everyone. Today, there is little question that
work is a right of membership, restricted to certain privileged classes
of non-citizens. 53 The boundary between rights of personhood and
membership has also shifted in the area of free speech; AmericanArab Anti-Discrimination Council and Bluman suggest that nonLPRs might have less First Amendment rights in certain contexts
than LPRs 54
Today it is harder than ever for a non-citizen to achieve
something close to membership status. Yet once a non-citizen has
secured LPR status, she will enjoy fewer membership rights than
during earlier eras. Moreover, non-citizens unable to become LPRs
cannot assume today that they can rely on strong rights of
personhood. Although procedural protections for unauthorized
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 699-700 (2001); Padilla v. Kentucky,
151.
130 S. Ct. 1473, 1486 (2010).
Verdugo-Urquidez v. INS, 494 U.S. 259, 274-75 (1990). As noted
152.
above, the search in Verdugo-Urquidez took place in Mexico, but the prosecution
at issue occurred in the United States.
See supra Part I.E.
153.
Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 491-92
154.
(1999); Bluman v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 800 F. Supp. 2d 281, 288 (D.D.C. 2011),
affd, 132 S. Ct. 1087 (2012).
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migrants remain largely strong, modern cases allow the government
to regulate their employment, limit their speech, and in some cases,
even search them without probable cause. 5'
D. Increasingly Popular Substitutes for Individual Rights
Professor Hiroshi Motomura has remarked that ambivalence
about immigration has led to a tendency for courts and agencies to
uphold immigrants' rights "indirectly and obliquely." 15 6 Given
immigrants' tenuous status as members of civil society, court rulings
that they enjoy membership rights are likely to generate controversy.
Many people do not agree that immigrants, especially unauthorized
ones, should have equal access to the privileges and benefits of
membership." 7 However, many would agree with the principle that
the federal government, not states, should have exclusive power
over immigration. Still more people would concede that agencies
should treat persons-even undocumented immigrants-rationally.
These two themes-federalism and agency skepticism-have become
powerful substitutes in recent years for immigrant rights like the
right to equal protection. Federalism and agency skepticism allow
immigrants to win cases by litigating in the safer context of federal
rights and responsibilities, rather than immigrant rights.
1. Federalism
Courts have often avoided the question of immigrant rights by
finding that non-citizens are the third party beneficiaries of other

155.
See supra Part I.E, G, H.
156.
Hiroshi Motomura, The Rights of Others: Legal Claims and
Immigration Outside the Law, 59 Duke L.J. 1723, 1727 (2010). Professor Hiroshi
Motomura identifies five strategies that have allowed unauthorized migrants to
indirectly assert rights: "institutional competence" arguments that the wrong
decision-maker acted; "comparative culpability" arguments that another actor has
done something worse than the unauthorized migrant's immigration violation;
"citizen proxy" arguments that mistreatment of an unauthorized migrant will
impact a citizen's rights; applying a "procedural surrogate" for a constitutional
right, such as a traditional discovery rule; and applying a "phantom norm," a
regulatory or statutory right in the absence of a constitutional one. Id. at 1726-29.
157.
David A. Martin, GraduatedApplication of ConstitutionalProtections
for Aliens: The Real Meaning of Zadvydas v Davis, 2001 Sup. Ct. Rev. 47, 92-101
(2001) (discussing the hierarchical treatment of different categories of
non-citizens under U.S. immigration law).
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rights holders, like citizens.158 Similarly, in recent years, non-citizens
have repeatedly benefited from federal rights in cases where courts
have invalidated state immigration legislation because it is
preempted by the federal government's exclusive right to regulate
immigration. State efforts to regulate immigration are longstanding;
indeed, until the late nineteenth century, virtually all immigration
law was state law. 159 However, since Chae Chan Ping v. United
60
States, the Court has held that immigration is a federal matter.
That has not stopped states from endeavoring to regulate
immigration, although they have had minimal success in their efforts
to do so. The Burger Court struck down an extraordinary amount of
6
In at least two of
state legislation on equal protection grounds.
but the
arguments,
preemption
raised
also
these cases, the plaintiffs
protection
equal
preferred
its
of
favor
in
these
Burger Court ignored
test.162 The advantage of equal protection over preemption as a
litigation strategy during this era is borne out by the fact that the
case of the time, De Canas v. Bica,
principal immigration preemption
163
state.
the
of
favor
in
out
came
The Court has since made an about-face. Neither the
Rehnquist nor the Roberts Court has invalidated a single piece of
immigration legislation on equal protection grounds. In the last equal
protection challenge to immigration legislation that the Court
decided, it ruled against the non-citizen, who had challenged a
provision of federal citizenship law that discriminated against

For an example of a case where a non-citizen was able to essentially
158.
proxy claim, see Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 647 (1948)
citizen
a
raise
(finding that a California statute barring the transfer of land to persons
"ineligible for citizenship" was unconstitutional as applied to the owner of the
property, a minor U.S. citizen whose parent was ineligible for citizenship by
virtue of his Japanese ancestry and had paid for the property). For a discussion of
citizen proxy claims, see Motomura, supra note 156, at 1751-55 (noting various
ways in which non-citizens have raised citizen proxy claims, such as in
deportation cases where non-citizens can seek discretionary relief from removal if
they can show hardship to a U.S. citizen relative, or in labor law cases where
judges have sometimes reasoned that citizen workers would be prejudiced by a
weakening of employment protections for unauthorized migrants).
See Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost Century of American Immigration
159.
Law (1776-1875), 93 Colum. L. Rev. 1833, 1835-84 (1993).
Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 605-07 (1889).
160.
See supranote 8.
161.
See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 208-09, 230 (1982); Sugarman v.
162.
Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 646 (1973).
De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 356 (1976).
163.
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children born out-of-wedlock to citizen fathers."' The law required
these children to meet more onerous requirements for citizenship
than they would have faced had their mother been a citizen.16 5 Of
course, Tuan Anh Nguyen v. INS concerned gender discrimination,
meaning that the Court at least purported to apply heightened
scrutiny (which it found the statute satisfied), and left unresolved the
question whether "some lesser degree of scrutiny pertains because the
statute implicates Congress' immigration and naturalization
'
power."166
In 2011, the challengers in Flores-Villar v. United States
resurrected that question in a challenge to a different citizenship
provision, and the Court again failed to decide it-this time because
no majority of the Court could agree on a coherent approach for
resolving the case, meaning that it affirmed the lower court decision
per curiam.167
Flores-Villar reveals that the state of equal protection review
in citizenship cases is embattled. Although it is unclear if this
ambivalence extends to immigration cases in general, the sheer
length of time since the Court has decided an equal protection case in
favor of a non-citizen suggests a shift away from immigrant equal
protection. On the other hand, it has become increasingly common for
courts to find that state immigration legislation is preempted by
federal law. In the past several years, a growing number of states and
localities have enacted legislation designed to address a perceived
problem with illegal immigration.16 Advocates and the federal
government have successfully challenged many of these statutes on
preemption grounds, most prominently the Arizona legislation. 169

164.
Tuan Anh Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 73 (2001).
165.
Id. at 62.
166.
Id. at 61.
167.
Flores-Villar v. United States, 131 S.Ct. 2312 (2011).
168.
The surge began in 2007, when state legislators passed 252 laws
relating to immigration, more than two-and-a-half times the 90 bills passed the
year before, and more than five times as many as the 45 laws passed in 2005.
National Conference of State Legislators, Immigrant Policy Project, 2012
Immigration-Related Laws and Resolutions in the States 2 (2012), available at
http://www.ncsl.org/Portals/l/Documents/immig/20121mmigrationReportJuly.pdf.
From 2007 through the first half of 2012, states have passed an astonishing 1,716
immigration laws. Id.
169.
See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012); Villas at
Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, 675 F.3d 802 (5th Cir. 2012);
Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 620 F.3d 170 (3d Cir. 2010), vacated, 131 S. Ct. 2958
(2011) (vacating for further consideration in light of Chamber of Commerce of
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Arizona's "Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe
Neighborhoods Act," or SB 1070, was passed as part of the State's
strategy of "attrition through enforcement," an effort to curb the
undocumented population in Arizona by making life unpleasant for
them. 170 In 2012, the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality
of four provisions of SB 1070: Section 2(B), which requires officers to
check an arrested person's immigration status with the federal
government if they have reasonable suspicion that the person is
undocumented; Section 3, making failure to comply with federal
alien-registration requirements a state misdemeanor; Section 5,
making it a misdemeanor for an unauthorized alien to seek or engage
in work in the State; and Section 6 authorizing officers to arrest
without a warrant a person who the officer has probable cause to
171
The Supreme Court found that
believe is subject to removal.
sections 3, 5 and 6 were preempted by federal law but reversed the
lower court's injunction against Section 2(B), remanding the case for
72
additional findings as to that provision.'
SB 1070, of course, does not just raise preemption concerns.
Race, ethnicity, language, and national origin are the inevitable
proxies that Arizona law enforcement will use to decide whether to
detain, question, and arrest the likely Latino suspects under the law.
Targeting persons based on these invidious criteria raises serious
issues under the Fourth Amendment and the Equal Protection
Clause.17' Even just subjecting persons to detention for the purpose of
assessing their citizenship raises due process and other constitutional
concerns.174 SB 1070 clearly implicates the rights of non-citizens, yet
nowhere in the decision are their rights mentioned.

United States of America v. Whiting, 131 S.Ct. 1968 (2011)); Garrett v. City of
Escondido, 465 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1054-57 (S.D. Cal. 2006).
See Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2497.
170.
Id. at 2497-98.
171.
Id. at 2510.
172.
See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 6, Friendly
173.
House v. Whiting, 846 F. Supp. 2d 1053 (D. Ariz. 2012) (No. CV 10-1061)
(challenging SB 1070 on Supremacy Clause, First Amendment, Fourth
Amendment, and Equal Protection grounds). Challenges that argue that state or
local immigration laws discriminate against persons based on their race or
national origin face a high threshold: The plaintiff must show actual
discriminatory intent, rather than mere disparate impact under the Equal
Protection Clause. See Motomura, supra note 156, at 1734-35.
See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690-91 (2001) (holding that as a
174.
matter of due process, civil detention requires a "sufficiently strong special
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Of course, the plaintiff in Arizona was the federal
government, which is perhaps less interested in raising immigrant
rights than in asserting its own power over the states. Moreover,
the government brought a facial challenge seeking to enjoin
the statute before it went into effect, making it impossible to
consider
facts
showing
that
the
statute
operates
to
discriminate against persons based on their race or other invidious
criteria.'75 In other cases, advocacy groups continue to bring equal
protection claims, with some modest successes.
However,
examination of these cases underscores that the playing field has
changed significantly since the days of the Burger Court.
For example, in Dandamudi v. Tisch,'7 6 a group of non-LPR
non-citizens challenged a New York licensing statute providing that
only non-citizens who were LPRs would be granted pharmacy
licenses. The plaintiffs raised both preemption and equal protection
challenges, and the Second Circuit upheld both. However, it went out
of its way to explain that the preemption claim was stronger and that
ordinarily it would not address an equal protection claim if the case
could be resolved on preemption grounds.'7 7 It felt constrained to
address the equal protection claim only because a provision of the
North American Free Trade Agreement deprived some of the
plaintiffs of standing to challenge the state law. 7 ' The Second
Circuit's admonition against deciding equal protection claims when
preemption theory resolves the case stands in contrast to cases like
Plyler and Sugarman, where the Court chose to decide the case on
equal protection rather than preemption grounds.'7 9
Today it is clear to most litigators that preemption is likely to
be more successful as a strategy than equal protection. For example,

justification" to outweigh
procedural protections").

175.

the

deprivation

of liberty,

as

well

as

"strong

On the other hand, the federal government might have argued, as the

plaintiffs in Friendly House did, that the legislative history and circumstances
surrounding enactment reflected an intent to discriminate against Hispanic
persons. See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 173, at
29-31. This strategy was attempted unsuccessfully in Lozano v. City of Hazleton,
496 F. Supp. 2d 477, 540 (M.D. Pa. 2007), affd in part, vacated in part, 620 F.3d
170 (3d Cir. 2010), vacated, 131 S. Ct. 2958 (2011).
176.
Dandamudi v. Tisch, 686 F.3d 66, 69-70 (2d Cir. 2012).
177.
Id. at 79-81.
178.
Id. at 81.
179.
See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S.
634 (1973).
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in Equal Access Education v. Merten, the plaintiffs did not even raise
an equal protection challenge to a Virginia Attorney General decision
barring higher education for undocumented students; they rested
s
In recent litigation
their argument on preemption grounds."'
concerning a section of Alabama law requiring verification of the
immigration status of enrolling students, both the federal
government and private plaintiffs brought suit, and the federal
government sought to have the case decided only on preemption
grounds.18s However, since Plyler v. Doe was clearly controlling
precedent, the court upheld the private plaintiffs' equal protection
claim-a rare example of a recent case affirming immigrants' equal
protection rights.'82
doctrine's fading
for equal protection
Explanations
will be
preemption
to
compared
jurisprudence
recent
in
prominence
larger
the
to
reiterate
enough
is
it
now
For
III.
Part
explored more in
immigrant
upholding
decisions
seven
issued
Court
trend: The Burger
equal protection rights; the Rehnquist and Roberts courts have issued
none. ' 3 Litigators today understand that the best way today to
challenge state legislation is not to assert immigraht rights, but
federal rights.
2. Agency Skepticism
When federal rather than state action is at issue, non-citizens
also seem less likely to win equal protection claims now than during
although the shift is mitigated
the era of the Burger Court,'
somewhat by the growing receptivity of courts to claims under
administrative law. This shift is epitomized by two cases, the Second
Circuit's 1976 decision in Francis v. INS and the Supreme Court's

Equal Access Educ. v. Merten, 305 F. Supp. 2d 585 (E.D. Va. 2004).
180.
See United States v. Alabama, 691 F.3d 1269, 1279 (11th Cir. 2012).
181.
Hispanic Interest Coal. of Ala. v. Governor of Ala., 691 F.3d 1236,
182.
1249 (11th Cir. 2012).
See supra note 8.
183.
Although the Burger Court issued most of its decisions concerning
184.
non-citizens' equal protection rights in state cases, it did suggest in two cases that
it would invalidate discriminatory federal action in egregious cases involving noncitizens. Hampton v. Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 101-05 (1976); Examining Bd. of Eng'rs,
Architects & Surveyors v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 600-01 (1976).
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decision last year in Judulang v. Holder.1 5 The two cases address the
same issue, but in a radically different way.
In Francis, the Second Circuit considered an anomaly of
immigration law: Courts regularly granted discretionary relief called
"Section 212(c) waivers" to deportable LPRs who had traveled abroad,
but because of the interstices of immigration law, refused to do so for
those who had never left the United States. 8 6 The court found that
privileging travelers in this way was irrational, and thus failed to
satisfy even the most minimal level of equal protection review."8 7 The
Board of Immigration Appeals adopted the Second Circuit's holding
nationwide"8 8 and the Francis holding was essentially the law of the
land until the Board, decades later, modified its eligibility criteria for
212(c) waivers in a way that resurrected the Francis problem. 9
Thus, last year the Supreme Court came to consider an issue that
most thought had been resolved by a prior generation.
In Judulang,the Court reached the same result as the Second
Circuit in Francis,but its reasoning reveals a dramatically changed
judicial culture. The Supreme Court barely even mentioned equal
protection; it based its decision on the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA). 9 ° On one hand, this might be viewed as a simple application
of the constitutional avoidance principles set out by Justice Brandeis
in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority: Courts should not decide

185.
Francis v. INS, 532 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1976); Judulang v. Holder, 132 S.
Ct. 476 (2011).
186.
Section 212 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) sets out the
categories of persons who are "inadmissible" (formerly "excludable") from the
United States. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (2006). A separate provision sets out the
grounds for deporting persons already present in the United States. See
8 U.S.C. § 1227 (2006). The now defunct Section 212(c) waiver, which Congress
repealed in 1996, "permitted the Attorney General to grant discretionary relief to
an excludable alien, if the alien had lawfully resided in the United States for at
least seven years before temporarily leaving the country and if the alien was not
excludable on one of two specified grounds." Judulang, 132 S. Ct. at 477. Since the
statute, by its terms, only applied to the grounds of exclusion, not the grounds of
deportability, the immigration agency sometimes only allowed persons charged
with exclusion to apply for the waiver, creating the anomaly at issue in Francis.
For more in depth discussion of the history of the waiver, see infra Part V.B.
187.
Francis, 532 F.2d at 273.
188.
In re Silva, 16 I. & N. Dec. 26 (1976).
189.
See In re Blake, 23 I. & N. Dec. 722, 728 (2005); In re Brieva-Perez, 23
I. & N. Dec. 766, 772-73 (2005).
190.
Judulang, 132 S. Ct. at 483-84.
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However, it is

odd that Judulang is the first time that the APA issue has come to
the fore in this context, given the extent of litigation on the issue. The
APA existed at the time of Francis and during the following decades,
but throughout this time, equal protection was the lens through
which litigators and courts viewed the issue, not the APA. It is
possible that the immigration attorneys who litigated these cases
were poorly versed in administrative law. But more likely, something
has changed in the law to make the APA a more attractive
alternative to equal protection than it was at the time of Francis. In
fact, there is much reason to believe that this is the case-that APA
review has become more robust, even as equal protection review
has weakened.' 9 2
The APA governs both formal agency rulemaking and agency
93
adjudication, and sets out a process for judicial review of both.
Courts can reverse agency policies that are "arbitrary, capricious, an
94
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law."' The
meaning of this standard has shifted over the years and there is now
a growing emphasis on "reasoned decisionmaking," with the Supreme
Court requiring that the agency's process "be logical and rational."''
As Justice Kagan pointed out in Judulang, that was not the case for
the Board's confusing "comparability test" for assessing eligibility for
a 212(c) waiver.196

Judulang is perhaps most remarkable for what it did not do.
Rather than follow the 1976 Francis decision affirming that
immigrants have a right to equal protection, it rebuked the
immigration bureaucracy for failing to meet APA standards of
rationality. This shift should come as no surprise; after Francis, the
circuit courts have rejected similar equal protection claims in every
other context they have been raised.1 97 On the other hand, lower

Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347-48 (1936)
191.
(Brandeis, J., concurring).
See infra Part IV.
192.
See Richard E. Levy & Robert L. Glicksman, Agency-Specific
193.
Precedents, 89 Tex. L. Rev. 499, 505-06 (2011).
5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006).
194.
Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359,
195.
374-75 (1998).
Judulang v. Holder, 132 S.Ct. 476, 484 (2011).
196.
See Abebe v. Mukasey, 554 F.3d 1203, 1207 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc);
197.
Zamora-Mallari v. Mukasey, 514 F.3d 679, 692-93 (7th Cir 2008); Caroleo v.
Gonzales, 476 F.3d 158, 168 (3d Cir. 2007); Vo v. Gonzales, 482 F.3d 363, 371-72
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courts have been increasingly willing to reverse agency action that
they perceive as irrational.
Consider the immigration jurisprudence of Judge Richard
Posner, one of the most influential appellate judges. In LaGuerre v.
Reno, Judge Posner rejected an equal protection challenge along the
same lines as the Francis claim.19 The challenge concerned a
provision of a 1996 reform that barred 212(c) waivers for non-citizens
convicted of certain drug-related offenses who were in deportation
proceedings but that did not bar the waiver for aliens charged with
exclusion on the basis of the same convictions. 99 Faced with the
seeming irrationality of treating LPRs differently depending on
whether they had left the country or stayed put, Judge Posner
invented a justification: The different treatment could be a "carrot" to
encourage deportable LPRs to leave voluntarily."0 Ultimately, the
rationale is facile, because when LPRs leave the United States, they
are not generally held at bay outside if they are deemed inadmissible;
they are placed on return into "deferred inspection" before becoming
subject to removal proceedings inside the United States. 20 1 These
proceedings can continue for years after their reentry, as if they had
never left and had been apprehend.edyarol placed in deportation
proceedings. If they end up -losing, "fidmissible" non-citizens are
removed at government expense, draining the federal fisc at the same
rate as those who never left. There is no cost savings to the
government, in other words, in encouraging deportable LPRs to travel
outside the United States. Yet regardless of the flaws in this

(5th Cir. 2007); Valere v. Gonzales, 473 F.3d 757, 762 (7th Cir. 2007); Vue v.
Gonzales, 496 F.3d 858, 860-61 (8th Cir. 2007); Kim v. Gonzales, 468 F.3d 58, 62
(1st Cir. 2006); LaGuerre v. Reno, 164 F.3d 1035, 1041 (7th Cir. 1998);
Komarenko v. INS, 35 F.3d 432, 434-35 (9th Cir.1994). But see Blake v. Carbone,
489 F.3d 88, 101-05 (2d Cir. 2007) (adhering to the Second Circuit's decision in
Francis).
198.
LaGuerre v. Reno, 164 F.3d at 1041.
199.
Id. at 1037.
200.
Id. at 1041.
201.
Technically, removal proceedings are allowed to be conducted for
persons held in foreign contiguous territory, 8 U.S.C. § 1225 (2006), but there are
no immigration courts outside the United States. Thus, Customs and Border
Protection officers typically "defer inspection" of LPRs with criminal convictions
until they obtain certified statements of disposition for those convictions. See 8
C.F.R. §§ 235.2, 1235.2 (2012). After review of those dispositions, officers may
issue a Notice to Appear for removal proceedings at an immigration court inside
the United States. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 239.1, 1239.1 (2012).
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justification, it has become popular with other circuit courts,
2 °2
including the entire Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc.
Despite Judge Posner's skepticism of equal protection claims
like LaGuerre's, he often rules in favor of non-citizens, especially in
asylum cases. An examination of Judge Posner's immigration
decisions over the ten-year period from 2002 through 2011 reveals
that he ruled in favor of twice as many non-citizen petitioners as he
ruled against. 2 3 However, only three decisions could be even remotely
characterized as finding that the non-citizen's "rights" were in some
04
sense violated, and none of these involved constitutional claims. In
fact, Judge Posner often refused to consider constitutional arguments
0 5
when the issue could be given a more pedestrian characterization.
In contrast, all thirty-four pro-immigrant decisions during this time
period contained language criticizing the rationality of the

Abebe, 554 F.3d at 1207 (citing LaGuerre, 164 F.3d at 1041).
202.
I conducted a Westlaw search for decisions written by Judge Posner
203.
after December 31, 2001, and before January 2, 2012, where the decision used the
phrase "Board of Immigration Appeals." This allowed me to find 54 decisions
where Judge Posner was the chief author. (I eliminated two decisions where he
was in dissent and one where he filed a concurrence.) By searching for the phrase
"Board of Immigration Appeals," I was able to pinpoint removal and related cases;
all were petitions for review of decisions of the Board of Immigration Appeals or
motions or fee petitions related to petitions for review except for one habeas
petition that was related to a removal case, Hussain v. Mukasey, 510 F.3d 739
(7th Cir. 2007), and one mandamus case, Samirah v. Holder, 627 F.3d 652 (7th
Cir. 2010).
Samirah, 627 F.3d at 655-65 (finding that the government was
204.
required to admit a non-citizen applicant for adjustment of status who had left the
United States after the government had granted him advance parole to leave and
reenter); Muhur v. Ashcroft, 382 F.3d 653, 655-56 (7th Cir. 2004) (granting the
petitioner's motion for attorney's fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act
because the petitioner was the prevailing party in her appeal and the
Miljkovic
justified);
substantially
not
was
position
government's
v. Ashcroft, 366 F.3d 580, 583-84 (7th Cir. 2004) (granting a motion to add the
petitioner's wife to a petition for review because the court found that she was a
party and the omission of her name was in the nature of a motion to correct a
clerical error).
For example, in Subhan v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 591 (7th Cir. 2004),
205.
Judge Posner ruled in the petitioner's favor on statutory and administrative law
grounds, meaning that the Court was not required to address the petitioner's due
process claim. Id. at 595. However, Judge Posner went out of his way to note his
skepticism of the claim, stating his "reluctance to emasculate" a jurisdictional
statute that barred review of discretionary claims "by equating arbitrary rulings
to denials of due process." Id. at 595-96.
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government actors, often very harshly." 6 Judge Posner's contempt for
the immigration agency appears to be so great that even when he
ruled in favor of the government, he still regularly criticized the
agency, questioning, among other qualities, its rationality,
competence, and capacity for legal precision. °7
Judulang and Judge Posner's influential immigration
jurisprudence reveal a growing movement toward closer scrutiny of
the immigration agency. But this scrutiny rarely if ever takes the
form of courts examining whether the agency has trampled on
immigrant rights, other than a generalized right to a fair hearing.
Rather, courts increasingly draw on APA and other administrative
law principles to probe the rationality of agency action.
IV. WHY THE SHIFT MIGHT HAVE HAPPENED
The multi-faceted changes detailed above-from restrictions
on non-citizen voting to changing attitudes about work-no doubt
have complex and varied causes. However, it is possible to suggest
some reasons for one of the changes outlined above: the
jurisprudential shift away from the Burger Court's heyday for
immigrant equal protection. First, there have been substantial
changes in the Court's doctrine. Over the past several decades, a
more conservative Court has narrowly interpreted equal protection
law and rights claims in general, significantly transforming the
state of American constitutional law in a way that makes it more

206.
In Guchshenkov v. Ashcroft, 366 F.3d 554 (7th Cir. 2004), in response
to Judge Posner's scathing opinion, Judge Evans filed a concurrence "to express
my concern, and growing unease, with what I see as a recent trend by this court to
be unnecessarily critical of the work product produced by immigration judges who
have the unenviable duty of adjudicating these difficult cases in the first
instance." Id. at 560.
207.
See, e.g., Gonzales-Balderas v. Holder, 597 F.3d 869, 870-71 (7th Cir.
2010) (criticizing, in three long paragraphs, the immigration judge's use of the
word "pretermitted"); Ahmed v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 247, 248 (7th Cir. 2007)
(describing a Board of Immigration Appeals decision as "a piece of boilerplate
mindlessly affixed to a case to which it's irrelevant"); Derezinski v. Mukasey, 516
F.3d 619, 622-23 (7th Cir. 2007) (bemoaning immigration court's failure to
include the date, time, and place of an upcoming hearing in order to show cause);
Djouma v. Gonzales, 429 F.3d 685, 687 (7th Cir. 2005) (criticizing immigration
judge for relying on an incomplete and "garbled" transcript of a Canadian
immigration hearing); Mei v. Ashcroft, 393 F.3d 737, 738-38 (7th Cir. 2004)
(dwelling, for an entire page, on the failings of a Board of Immigration
Appeals decision).
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2
difficult for non-citizens to prevail on individual rights claims. "'
Lawyers have no doubt responded to this shift by searching for
alternative theories, and their success has led to increasing positive
jurisprudence in these newer areas rather than in the arena of
individual rights.
21 °
and the
At the same time, the public,20 9 policymakers,
increasingly frustrated with illegal
have become
courts
immigration and the perceived incompetence of the relevant agencies
to stop it. Interestingly, this frustration has not translated to greater
deference to the states' efforts to regulate immigration, perhaps
because doing so would weaken the plenary power doctrine that has
served for more than a hundred years as a means of restricting
immigrant rights.212 It has, however, filtered into court decisions in
another way: an increase in courts' skepticism of agency competence,
such as that evinced by Judge Posner's immigration opinions. This
shift dovetails with other trends in administrative law, such as the
growing power of the APA. All of these changes have made it easier
for non-citizens to prevail in challenges based in federalism or
administrative law than individual rights like equal protection, as
they often did during the Burger Court era.
211

See Adam Liptak, Court Under Roberts Is Most Conservative in
208.
Decades, N.Y. Times, July 24, 2010, at Al (discussing empirical analyses showing
collectively that the Roberts Court is more conservative than the Rehnquist or
Burger courts, both of which were more conservative than the Warren court).
See Public Favors Tougher Border Controls and Path to Citizenship,
209.
Pew Research Ctr. for the People & the Press, http://pewresearch.org/pubs/
1904/poll-illegal-immigration-border-security-path-to-citizenship--birthrightcitizenship-arizona-law (last visited Nov. 2, 2012) (indicating that, as of February
2011, 42% of poll respondents want to tighten border security and 61% favored
controversial Arizona's SB 1070 law).
See, e.g., Julia Preston, Republican Immigration Platform Backs
210.
'Self-Deportation,' N.Y. Times The Caucus Blog (Aug. 23, 2012, 10:46 AM),
http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/08/23/republican-immigration-platformbacks-self-deportation (outlining Republican Party policies aimed at curbing
illegal immigration).
See, e.g., supra note 206 and accompanying text; see also Arizona v.
211.
United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2522 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Federal
officials have been unable to remedy the problem [of illegal immigration], and
indeed have recently shown that they are unwilling to do so.").
See, e.g., Arizona, 132 S.Ct. at 2510 (majority opinion) (invalidating
212.
several provisions of Arizona's SB 1070 immigration law on preemption grounds).
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A. Equal Protection Doctrine
The Supreme Court's interpretation of the Equal Protection
Clause has shifted considerably since Graham v. Richardson. It is
now clear, for example, that discriminatory impact is an insufficient
basis for an equal protection claim; a litigant must show actual
discriminatory motive or purpose.213 It might be inferred from Yick
Wo v. Hopkins that a law with a disproportionate impact on a
particular protected class violates equal protection, and up until
1976, a number of lower courts had in fact assumed that was the
case. That year, the Court decided Washington v. Davis, in which it
categorically rejected disparate impact as a basis for an equal
protection claim.2 14
The Court's decision in Washington v. Davis was
foreshadowed by a decision that Justice Rehnquist wrote shortly after
he joined the Court: Jefferson v. Hackney, in which the Court rejected
a de facto discrimination claim in the welfare benefits context.2"5
Justice Rehnquist had restrictive views of individual rights in general
and equal protection in particular,2" 6 and his influence no doubt
contributed over the course of the following decades to a shift in equal
protection doctrine. During the Burger Court era, Justice Rehnquist
dissented in every single one of the immigration cases that the Court
decided on equal protection grounds.2 17 As Chief Justice (beginning in
1986), Rehnquist presided over a sweeping revision of court doctrine,
one that increased the importance of structural categories like
federalism
over
the
individual
rights-based
analysis
of the Warren and Burger courts.21 8 During that time, equal
protection doctrine grew particularly lean: no new suspect

213.
See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,
264-66 (1977).
214.
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976).
215.
Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 549-50 (1972).
216.
See David L. Shapiro, Mr. Justice Rehnquist: A PreliminaryReview, 90
Harv. L. Rev. 293, 309 (1976); Erwin Chemerinsky, Assessing Chief Justice
William Rehnquist, 154 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1331, 1343-54 (2006).
217.
See Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 228 (1984) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 242 (1982) (Burger, J., dissenting);
Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 17 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Examining
Bd. of Eng'rs, Architects & Surveyors v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 606
(1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 730 (1973)
(Burger, J., dissenting); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 649 (1973)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
218.
Chemerinsky, supra note 216, at 1342-43.
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More
classifications or fundamental rights were recognized.
importantly for this Article, the Court did not decide a single equal
protection case in favor of a non-citizen-a record that has persisted
into the Roberts Court.

The changing composition and doctrine of the Court might
explain why it stopped issuing pro-immigrant equal protection
decisions, but it does not explain why the Court became more willing
to rule in non-citizens' favor on preemption or administrative law
grounds. After all, former Chief Justice Rehnquist and some of the
other conservative Supreme Court justices have strongly favored
22
states' rights in other areas outside immigration. 1 Yet the generally
conservative Justice Kennedy drafted the opinion in Arizona v.
United States, and Justice Rehnquist's former law clerk, Chief Justice
Roberts, joined Justice Kennedy's opinion finding that federal law
preempted state efforts to regulate immigration.
Even more remarkably, every single Supreme Court justice
signed onto the Judulang v. Holder decision finding that the Board of
Immigration Appeals's standard for discretionary waivers was
arbitrary and capricious in violation of the APA. This is a significant
development given that equal protection challenges to the
discrimination at issue in Judulangfailed in seven of eight circuits to
consider the issue.221 The equal protection claim was before the Court
in the case,222 but Judulang's attorney did not emphasize it, and the
Court barely mentioned it in its opinion."' Once the playing field was
shifted from a question of immigrant rights to agency competence, the
case proved a surprisingly easy one to win.

219.

Id.

Shapiro, supra note 216, at 294; Chemerinsky, supra note 216, at
220.
1360-63.
Compare Abebe v. Mukasey, 554 F.3d 1203, 1207 (9th Cir. 2009) (en
221.
banc), Zamora-Mallari v. Mukasey, 514 F.3d 679 (7th Cir. 2008), Falaniko v.
Mukasey, 272 F. App'x 742, 748 (10th Cir. 2008), Caroleo v. Gonzales, 476 F.3d
158, 168 (3d Cir. 2007), Dung Tri Vo v. Gonzales, 482 F.3d 363 (5th Cir. 2007),
Vue v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 858, 860 (8th Cir. 2007), Kim v. Gonzales, 468 F.3d 58,
62 (1st Cir. 2006) with Blake v. Carbone, 489 F.3d 88, 101-05 (2d Cir. 2007).
See Brief for Petitioner at 51-53, Judulang v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 476
222.
(2011) (No. 10-694).
The only place where the Court addresses the equal protection claim
223.
that defined this issue for 35 years was in a footnote, in which it expressed some
skepticism about the claim, but noted that it would not fully consider it, given
that the case was being resolved on APA grounds. Judulang, 132 S. Ct. at
490, n.8.
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B. Popular Opinion
During the 1970s and 1980s, lawmakers, judges, and the
public were all concerned in much the same way as today about
the creation of a substantial 'shadow population' of illegal
migrants-numbering in the millions-within our borders."22 The
prevalence of the Burger Court's decisions addressing state efforts to
restrict immigrants' access to state services is evidence in and of itself
that the dynamic of the time was somewhat similar to that in states
like Arizona and Alabama today. The public was frustrated then with
the government's failure to enforce the law; even Justice Brennan
referred to "[s]heer incapability or lax enforcement of the laws
barring entry into this country."22
If there has been a change in the past few decades, it is that
these attitudes have calcified. Despite a series of legal reforms over
the past twenty-five years designed to combat unauthorized
immigration, it seems that an increasing share of the public perceives
the federal government to be ineffective at enforcing immigration
laws in the face of an "invasion" or "flood" of illegal immigration.226 As
disillusionment with federal enforcement has grown, states have
enacted more and more laws relating to immigration. In 2005, states
enacted thirty-nine bills related to immigration; in the first half of
2012 alone, states have enacted 111 immigration laws.227
There is evidence that even some members of the current
Supreme Court share the public's disillusionment with federal
enforcement efforts. During the Arizona v. United States oral
argument, Justice Kennedy articulated the invasion theory in the
form of a thinly-veiled hypothetical, asking the Solicitor General to
presume that "the State of Arizona has-has a massive emergency,
with social disruption, economic disruption, residents leaving the
State because of [a] flood of immigrants. '22" At another point, Chief
Justice Roberts echoed popular disdain with the federal government's
inability to enforce immigration law: "It seems to me that the Federal

224.
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 218 (1982). For a history of the legal and
cultural category "illegal aliens," see Mae M. Ngai, Impossible Subjects: Illegal
Aliens and the Making of Modern America (2004).
225.
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 218 (1982).
226.
See Stephen H. Legomsky, Portraitsof the Undocumented Immigrant:
A Dialogue, 44 Ga. L. Rev. 65, 73-74 (2009).
227.
Nat'l Conf. of State Legislators, supra note 168, at 2.
228.
Transcript of Oral Argument at 61, Arizona v. United States, 132 S.
Ct. 2492 (2012) (No. 11-182).
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Government just doesn't want to know who's here illegally or not."
Justice Scalia offered the harshest attack on the federal government's
failure to enforce immigration law in his written dissent in the
Arizona case, referring contemptuously to the federal government's
announcement, unrelated to the Arizona case, that it would exercise
its prosecutorial discretion to not deport certain immigrant youth
through its DACA initiative:
Arizona bears the brunt of the country's illegal
immigration problem. Its citizens feel themselves
under siege by large numbers of illegal immigrants
who invade their property, strain their social services,
and even place their lives in jeopardy. Federal
officials have been unable to remedy the problem, and
indeed3 0have recently shown that they are unwilling to

do

2

SO.

Despite Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy's personal
opinions of federal enforcement efforts, they, unlike Justice Scalia,
still ruled in the federal government's favor. The reasons for their
deference to the federal government are mostly well-established ones:
in Arizona, Justice Kennedy wrote at some length about the
connection between immigration and the exclusively federal matter
connection first made in the Chinese
of foreign relations 2 31-a
232
exclusion case, Chae Chan Ping v. United States. As we saw in Part
I, this "plenary power" doctrine has been used repeatedly over the
years as a justification for declining to review immigrant rights
claims. It is therefore consistent, in a way, for the Court to grow more
deferential of federal power over states in immigration matters, at
the same time that it is less willing to consider non-citizens' rights
claims. Preemption allows the Court to affirm the vulnerability of
non-citizens' to federal power while still striking down excessive and
politically controversial programs like Arizona's.
Non-citizens benefit from decisions like Arizona, but the
Court's rationale could easily be used against them to reject future
immigrant rights-based challenges to federal power. The end result of
the Court's growing preference for analyses based on federalism over
individual rights claims is a diminution in precedent concerning
individual rights, which over time likely results in a reduction in the

229.

Id. at 50.

230.
231.
232.

Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2522 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2498-500 (majority opinion).
Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 605-06 (1889).
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number of rights claims that are raised. There seems to be a
correlation between an increase in federalism-based decisions and a
reduction in individual rights-based decisions, and perhaps a kind of
causal relationship, too, since good lawyers look not just for good
theories, but ones that work. The more that preemption succeeds, the
more lawyers bring such claims and courts decide them, building
momentum for structural claims while individual rights theories
come to a standstill.
C. Administrative Law and Theory
Although the Supreme Court ultimately deferred, for the
most part, to the federal government in Arizona, the opinion and oral
argument reveal a profound suspicion of the federal government's
competency to enforce immigration laws. This skepticism may be
filtering into immigration jurisprudence in other ways, such as the
Court's decreasing deference to agency action in cases like Judulang
v. Holder. Judges who think the federal agency is incompetent to
control the borders may be less inclined to think the agency is
competent to adjudicate individual cases.
Agency skepticism in immigration matters dovetails with a
general anti-regulatory trend that has been building steam in recent
decades. Early theories of administrative law were sanguine about
administrative agencies: The "expertise" model conceived of agencies
as reliable experts, disciplined by "the knowledge that comes from
specialized experience."2 33 However, over time commentators grew
increasingly critical of agencies' capacity to trample on individual
liberty without adequate processes.2 34 The result was the APA, a
compromise between New Deal liberals and conservatives who
3 5
wanted to radically rein in the new administrative state.
The New Dealers may have had the upper hand in 1946, but
over the years since, the APA has evolved into a powerful tool for
resisting regulation. In the decades following enactment of the APA,
courts engaged in increasingly rigorous review of the evidence

233.
See Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative
Law, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 1667, 1678 (1975).
234.
See Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38
Stan. L. Rev. 1189, 1264 (1986).
235.
See George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The Administrative
Procedure Act Emerges from New Deal Politics, 90 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1557,
1681 (1996).
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supporting agency fact-finding and required additional due process
for agency action implicating property interests.236 They began to
evaluate both the process of agency policymaking and the underlying
substance to ensure that agency policy was rationally related to
some legitimate governmental
objective.237
Over time, the
standard for assessing whether agency action violates the APA's
injunction against arbitrary and capricious conduct became
increasingly rigorous.23 s
Today many courts have adopted a very strict version of the
arbitrary and capricious test called the "hard look" doctrine, in which
they closely scrutinize the agency's reasoning. 239 Although originally
the arbitrary and capricious standard was modeled after rational
basis equal protection review,24 ° there can be little doubt that in their
current forms, the APA contains the stricter test. Since the early
1960s, the Supreme Court has held that any conceivable
governmental objective will satisfy equal protection rational basis
review, regardless of whether it was the one that Congress actually
had in mind.241 Under the APA, in contrast, courts look at the
agency's record to understand whether its rules are tailored closely
enough to its stated objectives.24 2 Hard look review requires that
agencies give detailed explanations for their behavior, consider viable
alternatives, explain departures from past practices, and make policy
choices that are reasonable on the merits.24 3 Under the standard set
out in Motor Vehicle ManufacturersAssociation v. State Farm, a court
can even reverse agency action where it fails "to consider an
important aspect of the problem"-in other words, where a reason not

236.
Stewart, supra note 233, at 1679.
237.
Id. at 1679-80.
238.
See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrarinessand
Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 461, 476 (2003).
239.
See Elena Kagan, PresidentialAdministration, 114 Harv. L. Rev.
2245, 2380 (2001); Levy & Glicksman, supra note 193 at 527.
240.
See Jack M. Beermann & Gary Lawson, Reprocessing Vermont Yankee,
75 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 856, 870 (2007); Scott A. Keller, Depoliticizing Judicial
Review of Agency Rulemaking, 84 Wash. L. Rev. 419, 430 (2009).
241.
See Robert W. Bennett, "Mere" Rationality in Constitutional Law:
JudicialReview and Democratic Theory, 67 Cal. L. Rev. 1049, 1057-58 (1979).
242.
It has become a maxim of administrative law that agency action must
stand or fall based on the agency's stated objectives, not post-hoc rationalizations.
See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 88 (1943).
243.
See supra note 239 and accompanying text.

2013]

Persons Who Are Not the People

415

weighed by the agency counsels against the policy. 244 This is a far
more rigorous test of rationality than that used in the equal
protection context.
The growing power of the APA may owe its intellectual roots
to academic doctrines like Public Choice theory and the Law and
Economics movement. Both doctrines utilize economic theory to
analyze legal or political problems, taking as a given that individuals
are rational and self-interested. Public Choice and Law and
Economics are heterogeneous (and sometimes related) doctrines. The
doctrinal nuances of Law and Economics and Public Choice theory
cannot be neatly summarized, and scholars of both doctrines have
deep internal disagreements. However, both have had considerable
impact on judicial review and the legal culture at large.
Public Choice theory developed between the 1940s and 1960s
as a means of conceptualizing group decision-making through
econometric modeling.2 41 Modern Public Choice scholarship developed
a pessimistic outlook on the political process,2 46 and was often
particularly hostile to administrative agencies, "portraying agency
bureaucrats as shirking, self-interested budget-maximizers who
thwart the will of the people and good government."2 47 Some Public

244.
See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463
U.S. 29, 43 (1983).
245.
See, e.g., Kenneth J. Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values
(1951) (describing for the first time the Impossibility Theorem of voting, which
states that rank order voting does not properly express community-wide
preferences); James M. Buchanan & Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent:
Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy (1962) (exploring the societal
effects of different public decision-making systems); Duncan Black, On the
Rationale of Group Decision Making, 56 J. Pol. Econ. 23 (1948) (illustrating how
models for determining the outcomes of group votes based on the preference of
individual members support the median voter theory). Scholars of Public Choice
theory extended the economist's model of utility maximizing behavior to social
choice and interest group politics. See David A. Skeel, Jr., Public Choice and
the Future of Public-Choice-InfluencedLegal Scholarship, 50 Vand. L. Rev. 647,
651 (1997). Central to their work was the conceptualization of "politics as
exchange"--the notion that "the political sphere is a market in which voters and
representatives, like consumers and firms, act as if they are rational, maximizing
individuals pursuing their self-interests." Jim Rossi, Public Choice Theory and the
Fragmented Web of the Contemporary Administrative State, 96 Mich. L. Rev.
1746, 1752 (1998).
246.
See Jerry L. Mashaw, Greed, Chaos, & Governance: Using Public
Choice to Improve Public Law 10-21 (1997).
247.
David B. Spence & Frank Cross, A Public Choice Case for the
Administrative State, 89 Geo. L.J. 97, 99 (2000).
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Choice scholars attacked administrative law at its core, arguing
against agency delegation.248 In a general way, Public Choice ideas
impacted public opinion, the courts, and policy makers, justifying not
only improved due process in administrative proceedings, but also
sweeping deregulation.24 9
Law and Economics developed at approximately the same
time, in the early 1960s. Heavily shaped by the early academic work
of Judge Richard Posner, the Chicago School of Law and Economics
contends that the common law is the result of an effort, conscious or
not, to induce efficient outcomes. Like Public Choice, Law and
Economics contributed in important ways to the deregulatory policy
agenda that transformed American society from the 1970s through

the 1990s.

250

It is perhaps no accident that one of the most vocal critics of
the immigration bureaucracy is Judge Posner, an important theorist
of the Chicago School, who also dabbled in his early days with Public
Choice approaches to statutory interpretation.2 5' It is natural for
Judge Posner to rail against the incompetence of the immigration
bureaucracy and irrationality of immigration law because he cut his
teeth railing against agency regulation in general.
Of course, most judges are not Law and Economics or Public
Choice scholars. However, these ideas have not only gained great
currency in the legal academy; 25 2 they have had a broader cultural

248.
See David Schoenbrod, Power Without Responsibility: How Congress
Abuses the People Through Delegation (1993); Peter H. Aranson et al., A Theory
of Legislative Delegation, 68 Cornell L. Rev. 1 (1982). For a public choice
argument in favor of delegation, see Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why
AdministratorsShould Make PoliticalDecisions, 1 J.L. Econ. & Org. 81 (1985).
249.
Rossi, supra note 245, at 1754; Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory
and the Courts: 1967-1983, 72 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1039, 1062-68 (1997).
250.
See Richard A. Posner, The Deprofessionalization of Legal Teaching
and Scholarship, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 1921, 1925 (1993). For an early history of
deregulation, see Abner J. Mikva, DeregulatingThrough the Back Door: The Hard
Way to Fight A Revolution, 57 U. Chi. L. Rev. 521, 522-38 (1990). For a discussion
of the way in which cost benefit analysis has impeded health and safety
regulation, see Frank Ackerman & Lisa Heinzerling, Priceless: On Knowing the
Price of Everything and the Value of Nothing 24-122 (2004) (arguing that cost
benefit analysis relies in many cases on questionable valuations of invaluable
goods like life, health, and environmental quality).
251.
Skeel, supra note 245, at 660.
252.
See Merrill, supra note 249, at 1068 (noting the ascendency of public
choice theory in the legal academy); Posner, supra note 250, at 1925-26
(discussing the impact of Law and Economics).
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impact in the form of general anti-regulatory sentiment and suspicion
of government at all levels.25 3 Their ascendance is part of a climate in
which judges' level of agency skepticism and their willingness to
probe the rationality of immigration agency action through the lens of
administrative law has steadily increased. This is not to say that Law
and Economics or Public Choice scholars themselves even agree on
the importance of intrusive agency review, 5 4 or that most judges are
familiar with these theories, but only that the growth of Law and
Economics and Public Choice theory are part of a general intellectual
culture of agency skepticism.
Although it is impossible to precisely pinpoint the causes of
the shift from the Burger Court's emphasis on immigrant equal
protection to the emphasis of courts today on federalism and agency
skepticism, we have identified some potential culprits. Chief Justice
Rehnquist presided over a revolution against individual rights claims
in general and immigrant rights in particular. Preemption analysis
allows courts to affirm federal power over immigrants at the same
time that they strike down excessive and politically controversial
state programs. Agency skepticism is fueled in part by popular
disaffection with the immigration agency (and government in
general), the prestige of academic doctrines like Public Choice and
Law and Economics, and the growing heft of the APA.
V. WHAT HAS BEEN LOST
If non-citizens achieve essentially the same outcome through
preemption or agency skepticism as they would as rights holders, one
might wonder what has been lost. Why would immigrants need rights
if the rights of the federal government were reliably enforced with
respect to state discrimination, and courts rigorously applied
administrative law principles when federal agency action is at issue?
Immigrant rights matter-for both non-citizens and for
society at large-for a variety of reasons. As a practical matter,
preemption and agency skepticism will do little for immigrants when
discriminatory federal statutes are at issue. Immigrants' interests
will not always converge with federal interests; there may be times

253.
Merrill, supra note 249, at 1053.
254.
Id. at 1072 (noting that Public Choice scholars do not agree on more
intrusive agency review).

COLUMBIA HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW

[44.2:367

when preemption will work against rather than in favor of
non-citizens. Similarly, agency skepticism may not always work in
favor of non-citizens; pro-immigrant policies are just as susceptible to
challenge under administrative law principles as anti-immigrant
adjudications. Taken to its logical conclusion, the rationality mandate
might swallow much immigration regulation; large swaths of
immigration law have evolved through decades' worth of agency
memoranda and guidance. This poses the risk of selective
enforcement of the APA rationality mandate, and a future judiciary
might be just as skeptical of pro-immigrant agency policies as judges
are of policies that adversely affect immigrants today.
More broadly, rights matter because they convey autonomy
and belonging. The United States' political system was consciously
cultivated to assure an egalitarian civil society and has evolved since,
albeit in fits and starts, toward greater inclusivity rather than
exclusivity.5 Thus, important democratic values may be prejudiced
by a diminution of rights analysis for a minority group. A loss in
immigrant rights might be a bellwether for a broader reduction of
American rights.
A. Gaps in Federalism
The obvious problem when non-citizens derive their rights
from the federal government is that non-citizens' interests will
not always converge with the federal government. For example, at
the same time that the Obama Administration has fought state
anti-immigrant legislation, it has also stepped up its own
enforcement efforts against so-called "criminal aliens." The linchpin
of this strategy is a program called "Secure Communities," under
which DHS receives fingerprint data for persons arrested by local law
enforcement; if the arrestee is a non-citizen, DHS issues a detainer
asking that the local agency hold the arrestee for up to forty-eight
hours while DHS arranges to detain the individual.256 Many states
and localities are eager to cooperate with Secure Communities, but
there are also some that have resisted compliance, like the District of
Columbia, Cook County (Chicago), San Francisco County, and Santa
Clara County.25 7

255.

See Lawrence H. Fuchs, The American Kaleidoscope: Race, Ethnicity,

and the Civic Culture 5-6 (1990).
256.
Supra note 28.
257.
Id.

20131

Persons Who Are Not the People

There are numerous legitimate policy reasons why states and
localities may not wish to cooperate with federal enforcement efforts.
The program may interfere with community policing efforts, making
non-citizens reluctant to come forward to report crimes. Data on
Secure Communities suggests that non-citizens arrested for minor
traffic offenses have born much of the brunt of the program, despite
the fact that it is targeted at non-citizens with serious offenses.2"' The
legal authority for DHS detainers is somewhat tenuous, 25 9 and states
and localities may be concerned that they will be subjected to
litigation for holding non-citizens beyond the period necessary for
their criminal sentence or pre-trial detention. 2 0 The loss of the
primary wage earner for a family, often composed in part of
U.S. citizens, typically leaves the family in a state of crisis, and the
state may not want to foot the bill for the family's welfare
afterward. 261 For that matter, the federal government does not even
fully reimburse states and localities for the extra period that they

258.
See American Friends Service Committee, Project Voice New England,
et al., Restoring Community: A National Community Advisory Report on ICE's
Failed 'Secure Communities' Program 5 (2011) (finding that less than one quarter
of those apprehended through Secure Communities fell within the category of
individuals ICE has defined as its first priority for removal).
259.
8 C.F.R. § 287.7 authorizes certain immigration officials to issue a
detainer and mandates that state and local agencies comply with the detainer for
a 48 hour period. As authority for this mandate, it cites two provisions of the
Immigration and Nationality Act: one governing removal of non-citizens, the
other, the powers of immigration officers. 8 C.F.R. § 287.7(a) (2012). However, the
removal provision is silent as to the question of detainers. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227
(2006). The other provision, 8 USC § 1357(d) does authorize the issuance of
immigration detainer to states and localities, but only "[iun the case of an alien
who is arrested by a ... State[] or local law enforcement official for a violation of
any law relating to controlled substances." 8 U.S.C. § 1357(d) (2006). Since the
provision only applies on its face to drug cases and fails to reference any time
period for detention, there is argument that the DHS regulation is ultra vires. Of
course the risk of making an argument of this type is that Congress will respond
by enacting a statute providing for broader authority.
260.
See, e.g., Brian Bennett, ProgramEnsnares U.S. citizen; He's suing the
FBI and Homeland Security After Being Flagged as an Illegal Immigrant and
Held in Prison, L.A. Times, July 6, 2012, at A9 (describing a lawsuit filed by the
National Immigrant Justice Center in Chicago after a U.S. citizen was incorrectly
identified through the Secure Communities program as an undocumented
immigrant and held for two months in a maximum security prison instead of the
drug treatment program to which he had been sentenced).
261.
See Daniel Kanstroom, Aftermath: Deportation Law and the New
American Diaspora 135-39 (2012).
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detain non-citizens.262 In the end, state and local policy makers
simply may not agree that non-citizen residents with substantial ties
to the state should be separated from their families and deported to
countries they often know little about.
As a matter of principle, if the federal government has the
right to preempt anti-immigrant rules, it should have a right to
preempt pro-immigrant policies too. Some might respond that the
federal government's power to compel state and local action is
distinguishable from its power to preempt. The Tenth Amendment
operates as a significant limitation on federal authority over the
states, providing that "[tihe powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are
reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."263 However, as
Arizona v. United States makes clear, immigration is just such a
power, and there is a lengthy historical record of the federal
government compelling or enlisting state action in the immigration
arena.264 This might be enough in and of itself to distinguish cases
that prohibit the federal government from commandeering state and
local action in other contexts.26 On the other hand, the detainer

262.
A portion of the costs associated with detainers for undocumented
individuals with a certain number of prior convictions is covered by a Department
of Justice program called the State Criminal Alien Assistance Program (SCAAP).
SCAAP only covers about 25% of the relevant costs in most cases. See Letter of
Richard M. Stana, Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues, United States
Governmental Accountability Office, to The Honorable John N. Hostettler,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security, and Claims
Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives (Apr. 7, 2005) at 3,
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05337r.pdf.
263.
U.S. Const. amend. X.
264.
See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2499 (2012). Statutes
enacted by the first Congresses required state courts to record applications for
citizenship, transmit abstracts of citizenship applications and other
naturalization records to the Secretary of State, and register aliens seeking
naturalization and issue certificates of registry. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S.
898, 905-06 (1997). Late nineteenth century immigration law enlisted the
cooperation of state officials "to take charge of the local affairs of immigration in
the ports within such State, and to provide for the support and relief of such
immigrants therein landing as may fall into distress or need of public aid"; to
inspect arriving immigrants and exclude any person found to be a "convict,
lunatic, idiot," or indigent; and to send convicts back to their country of origin
"without compensation." Printz, 521 U.S. at 916 (quoting Act of August 3, 1882,
ch. 376, §§ 2, 4, 22 Stat. 214).
265.
See Printz, 521 U.S. at 933 (finding that provisions of the Brady gun
law requiring local officers to conduct background checks on prospective handgun
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regulation does impose a financial obligation on local jails, and
without clear statutory authority to do so in all cases.266
Ultimately, the question whether the federal detainer
regulation is valid is complicated. Yet the central point of
Arizona-that states and localities cannot enact their own
immigration policies-weighs against the efforts of localities to resist
DHS detainers. Federalism does not provide a principled basis for
arguing both that states cannot enact and enforce immigration laws
and that localities can resist harsh federal programs. For that,
something more is required-that non-citizens have rights of their
own. In fact, holding non-citizens based on a mere federal statement
that DHS is conducting an investigation into non-citizen status ought
to raise serious Fourth Amendment issues.2 67 However, the
jurisprudence on non-citizens' Fourth Amendment rights has
sometimes looked grim. 6
The main point of this discussion is that if non-citizens have
no rights of their own, they might find themselves at the whim of the
executive, which may or may not have their interests at heart.269
History is rife with shameful examples of federal discrimination
against non-citizens, from the Palmer raids to Japanese
internment.27 Of course, non-citizens can rely on other rights
surrogates to attack federal action, like administrative law
arguments. When they grant these claims, courts tacitly acknowledge
non-citizens' rights to some extent. Yet, as we will see, administrative

purchasers imposed an unconstitutional obligation on state officers to execute
federal laws).
266.
See supra notes 259 and 262.
267.
Since immigration judges make ultimate determinations as to
deportability, the initial decision to apprehend a non-citizen is merely
investigatory, and warrantless arrests for investigative purposes are at odds with
the Fourth Amendment. See Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156,
169 (1972) ("We allow our police to make arrests only on 'probable
cause'... . Arresting a person on suspicion, like arresting a person for
investigation, is foreign to our system.").
268.
See supra Part I.B.1.
269.
During the Alien and Sedition Act debates, the DemocraticRepublicans argued in favor of non-citizen rights precisely because they were
concerned about the dangers to the constitutional order of having a large class of
persons living in this country at the pleasure of the executive. See Neuman, supra
note 34, at 57.
270.
See Daniel Kanstroom, Deportation Nation: Outsiders in American
History 149-55, 208-14 (2007).
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law can be used against non-citizens as easily as it can work in
their favor.
B. The Flaws of Agency Skepticism
The premise of the APA-that agencies should act
rationally-seems sound. Yet anyone who has ever dealt with a
bureaucracy knows that much bureaucratic action has little to do
with substantive rationality. Administrative agencies promulgate a
host of formal procedural rules-from the ministerial requirements of
their forms to the deadlines for filing them-that lack any
substantive rationale. Moreover, even many substantive bureaucratic
rules are not created through an intentional process; they evolve over
time as different types of bureaucrats compete for resources in a
changing environment." 1 Evolved agency rules are subject to attack
under the reasoned decision making requirement of the APA.
However, not all evolved law is harmful to agency constituents.
For example, the 212(c) waiver that the Supreme Court
considered in Judulang v. Holder never would have existed at all for
deportable non-citizens if the INS had not fitfully tried to help
deportable non-citizens in compelling cases.1 2 If the INS had stuck to
the statutory language, which applied on its face only to excludable
non-citizens, the 212(c) standard would not have been subject to APA
attack. The INS embarked on the path of irrationality when it
allowed deportable non-citizens to seek "nunc pro tunc" 212(c) relief
in cases when they had previously left the United States. 22 This and
other exceptions that the agency carved out to the statutory language
compounded the situation that the Second Circuit in Francis v. INS
found unconstitutional. By the time of Francis,the Board had already
gerrymandered the statute so much in its efforts to help non-citizens
that it no longer had the statutory language to fall back on as a
justification for its disparate treatment.274

See Anthony Downs, Inside Bureaucracy 198-210 (1967).
271.
The complicated evolution of the 212(c) standard is beyond the scope
272.
of this Article. Much of the history the 212(c) waiver and its predecessor, the
Seventh Proviso of the Immigration Act of 1917, § 3, 39 Stat. 874, 875-78 (1917),
are set out in Francis v. INS, 532 F.2d 268, 270-71 (2d Cir. 1976).
See In re L-, 1 I. & N. Dec. 1, 6 (1940) (holding that the Secretary of
273.
Labor has the power to grant a nunc pro tunc waiver of exclusion to a person
placed in deportation proceedings based on crimes committed before a prior entry
date, thereby eliminating the basis for the deportation proceedings).
Francis,532 F.2d at 271-72.
274.
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After the Second Circuit found that this policy violated equal
protection, the waiver again became broadly available to most
deportable non-citizens until 1996, when Congress replaced it with
"cancellation of removal," a form of discretionary relief that is
available to both inadmissible and deportable non-citizens, but not
to persons with convictions considered "aggravated felonies."2 75
Today 212(c) relief remains available to persons with aggravated
felonies only because the Supreme Court, in INS v. St. Cyr, found
that it would have been impermissibly retroactive for Congress to
have eliminated the waiver for persons who pled guilty to crimes in
reliance on its existence. 6 The Board implemented the St. Cyr
decision with regulations,2 77 which it later interpreted to mean that
only non-citizens charged with a ground of deportability with
substantially similar language to a ground of inadmissibility could
apply for the waiver.
It is true, as the Court said in Judulang, that the factors
relevant to this test bear no relationship to the question whether a
non-citizen deserves deportation. 279 But the basic feature that
made this comparability test irrational is one that Congress created:
the formalistic distinction between "deportable" and "inadmissible"
non-citizens. This distinction has led to countless instances of
arbitrary discrimination, and the courts have approved most of
them.28 ° Moreover, this distinction is only one of many bizarre aspects
of immigration law, which is so full of mechanistic rules, unexpected
pitfalls, and traps that courts have taken to repeatedly calling it a
"labyrinth."21 The point is not that DHS and its predecessor INS

275.
8 U.S.C. § 1229B(a)(3) (2006).
276.
INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 321-26 (2001).
277.
8 C.F.R. § 1212.3 (2012).
278.
In re Blake, 23 I. & N. Dec. 722, 728 (BIA 2005).
279.
Judulang v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 476, 478 (2011).
280.
The grounds of deportation and inadmissibility differ in subtle ways
that create inequitable results. For example, a person with a conviction for
possession of less than 30 grams of marijuana is not deportable, but is
inadmissible, meaning that if she never travels, she can continue to live in
the United States, but if she takes a trip abroad, she will be placed in
removal proceedings on her return. Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(C)
(2006) (ground of inadmissibility for controlled substances violations), with 8
U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (2006) (ground of deportation for controlled
substance offenses).
281.
Avagyan v. Holder, 646 F.3d 672, 679 (9th Cir. 2011); Hernandez v.
Mukasey, 524 F.3d 1014, 1018 (9th Cir. 2008); Biwot v. Gonzales, 403 F.3d 1094,
1098 (9th Cir. 2005).
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have been rational relative to Congress, but just that their actions are
no more irrational and in some cases, the agencies' missteps were
taken in good faith, in efforts to benefit immigrants.
In the case of the 212(c) rules, the standard had become so
corrupted that it benefited non-citizens to strike it down. But a more
recent example of agency action better demonstrates that sometimes
the APA may not help non-citizens. In August 2012, DHS announced
that it would grant a two-year deportation reprieve and confer work
permission on the group of immigrant youth who have come to be
called "DREAMers." DHS has mandated that in order to be eligible
for its new "Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals" (DACA) program,
the non-citizen must have:
" arrived in the United States under the age of
sixteen;
* continuously resided in the United States for
at least five years preceding June 15, 2012
and have been present in the United States on
June 15, 2012;
* currently be enrolled in school, graduated
from high school, have obtained a general
education development certificate (GED) or
have been honorably discharged veterans of
the U.S. Coast Guard or Armed Forces;
* not been convicted of a felony offense, a
significant misdemeanor offense, multiple
misdemeanor offenses, or otherwise pose a
threat to national security or public safety;
" be at least fifteen years old; and
2 2
* not be above the age of thirty. 1
Some of these requirements raise questions. For example,
unauthorized immigrants are ineligible to serve in the Armed
Forces, 8 3 making that provision seemingly inane. For that matter,
why should a fifteen-year-old immigrant be eligible to apply for relief
under the program, but not a fourteen-year-old? Perhaps DHS had a
reason for including the armed forces provision or limiting relief to
persons over the age of fifteen, but we have no idea what they were,

See Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Sec'y of Homeland Sec., to
282.
David V. Aguilar, Acting Comm'r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot., et al. (June 15,
2012) [hereinafter Napolitano Memo], available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/
assets/s 1-exercising-prosecutorial-discretion-individuals-who-came-to-us-aschildren.pdf.
10 U.S.C. § 504 (2006).
283.
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since there is no public record of its decision-making process. The
agency never gave formal notice of a proposed rulemaking nor invited
public comment. The agency's decision to proceed without formal
rulemaking has already led to one APA lawsuit: Crane v. Napolitano,
filed by a group of Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents and
284
the state of Mississippi.
Litigation against the DACA program will have to overcome
enormous jurisdictional hurdles." 5 That being said, the principles set
out in Judulang do not weigh in favor of the DACA program.
Judulang seemingly adopted the relatively strict version of the APA
standard of reasoned decision-making set out in Motor Vehicle
ManufacturersAssociation v. State Farm, a standard that empowers
courts to closely dissect agency decision-making." 6 Although DHS

284.
See Amended Complaint, Crane v. Napolitano, No. 3:12-CV-03247-O
(N.D. Tex. Oct. 10, 2012).
285.
Much of the jurisdictional battle will likely center on whether the
DACA program is merely an exercise of DHS's prosecutorial discretion to not
deport certain persons, or the conferral of a type of status on non-citizens without
Congress having conferred authority on the agency to do so. There are a host
of impediments to court review of agency prosecutorial discretion. See
5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (2006) (precluding APA review where a statute forecloses
review or the decision sought to be challenged is discretionary by law);
8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B) (2006) (precluding review of immigration matters subject
to the discretion of the DHS Secretary); Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831
(1985) ("[Aln agency's decision not to prosecute or enforce, whether through civil
or criminal process, is a decision generally committed to an agency's absolute
discretion"). Cf. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) (2006) (precluding review of decisions to
commence proceedings) (emphasis added). There are also rigorous standing
requirements under both Article III of the Constitution and the APA. In order to
meet Article III's requirements, the plaintiff must have (1) suffered an "injury in
fact" that is "(a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not
conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged
action of the defendant; and (3) it is likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that
the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision." Friends of the Earth, Inc. v.
Laidlaw Envt'l. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180-81 (2000) (quoting Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)). The litigant must also
establish standing under the APA, which authorizes review if there is "final
agency action" and the injured litigant is within the "'zone of interests' sought
to be protected by the statutory provision whose violation forms the legal basis
for his complaint." Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871,
882-83 (1990).
286.
Under State Farm, agency action can be struck down "if the agency
has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely
failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for
its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so
implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of
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gave reasonable explanations for the program,287 these explanations
might not fare well under the probing lens of State Farm.
Ultimately, the APA is a two-edged sword, which can be used
against immigrants just as easily as it can cut in their favor. A
"rational" deportation process, after all, is not necessarily the same
thing as a decent or fair one. Although non-citizens have lately fared
well with APA-type claims, the tables might turn, and the APA
and anti-regulatory sentiment might be used against programs
benefitting non-citizens just as they have served to invalidate liberal
agency policies in other contexts.2 s" Sometimes what will be needed to
protect non-citizens will not be an ostensibly value-neutral standard
focusing on reasoned decision-making, but one that looks more
broadly to substantive fairness-one, in other words, that looks like
a right.
VI.WHY RIGHTS MATTER
There has been a robust debate in the legal academy
concerning the existence and meaning of rights. In the 1920s and
1930s, legal realists depicted rights as social constructs.28 9 Yet there
was a powerful backlash to this work during and after World War
1I,29° which seemed to demonstrate the importance of political rights
as a buffer against fascism. A similar backlash ensued when Critical

agency expertise." Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983).
See Napolitano Memo, supra note 282, at 1.
287.
See Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The Real World of
288.
Arbitrariness Review, 75 U. Chi. L. Rev. 761, 767-68 (2008) (finding that the
political commitments of judges significantly influence the operation of arbitrary
and capricious review in EPA and NLRB cases); Richard L. Revesz,
Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 Va. L. Rev. 1717,
1738 (1997) (finding that in industry challenges to EPA action, Republicans had a
higher reversal rate than Democrats and for environmental challenges,
Democrats had a higher reversal rate than Republicans in all the periods).
289.
For a realist critique of property rights, see Robert L. Hale, Coercion
and Distributionin a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 Pol. Sci. Q. 470 (1923)
(contending that the market economy was the actual creator of property and
entitlements, rather than being a neutral institution that reflected pre-existing
property rights).
See, e.g., Walter B. Kennedy, A Review of Legal Realism, 9 Fordham L.
290.
Rev. 362, 373 (1940) ("The fatal divorce of the actual from the ideal or the real
from the abstract is a penetrating defect of realism which has ended in this
unqualified rejection of rule by law.").
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Legal Studies scholars argued in the 1980s that rights are
indeterminate and harmful legitimators of economic oppression.2 91
Critical Race Studies scholars eloquently rejoined that rights have
great instrumental value, noting their centrality to the historical
struggle of African Americans for equal treatment.2 92
The vigor of this debate underscores that the United States'
national identity has historically been linked to the question of rights.
It may be difficult to pinpoint exactly what a right is, but denying the
existence of rights strikes many as dangerous, particularly those who
have been historically relegated to the margins of society. As
Professor Patricia Williams points out, it is easiest for those
accustomed to privilege to dispense with rights.2 93 To a large extent,
rights matter because of what they signify about their holders:
autonomy and membership.
A. Rights of Personhood
All human beings are born free and equal in dignity
and rights.2 94
At their most basic level, rights imply subjectivity and
agency. Thus, persons, not animals or things, have historically had
rights.29 5 The classical liberal notion of rights as inherent in
personhood is something that heavily influenced the drafters of the
U.S. Constitution, who believed, according to Lockeian social contract
theory, that persons have natural rights, and government has only
those rights that persons relinquish to it for their mutual
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protection.29 6 John Stuart Mill believed that if government was
granted too many powers, it would trample upon the human
ingenuity that is essential for the progress of civilization.297 The
drafters of the Constitution took this danger seriously; hence, the Bill
of Rights is rather heavy on "negative rights"-the right to be free
from interference in one's personal dealings, provided that one is not
299
infringing on the rights of others to do the same.
In the Kantian sense of rights, rights holders are entitled to
be treated as an ends in and of themselves, rather than a means for
accomplishing other persons' ends, i.e. as things. 29 9 For both Kant and
Hegel, freedom is expressed through alienation, through persons'
exercising their will over things."' Similarly, Locke believed that
property-the ability to take and own things-was one of the three
in the
natural rights.30 ' One view of rights, then, is that they 3live
02
sometimes-contested territory between persons and things.
The classical liberal notion of rights of personhood appears to
have always been central to the American political system. The
founders held strongly to the liberal ideas of Locke and Mill, who
believed that persons were autonomous agents with natural rights
who should retain a sphere of individual liberty free from
governmental restraint. 0 3 Many of the "negative" rights in the Bill of
Rights-free speech, freedom from unreasonable searches and
seizures, and due process-seem to stem from this notion of rights as
inalienable expressions of personhood, emanating from that residual
sphere of autonomy untouched by the social contract.
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The founders likely viewed these as natural rights, which is
perhaps why they used the terms "people" and "person" instead of
"citizen" when enumerating them.3 °4 Pointing to the universalistic
language of the text, Alexander Bickel argued that the American
Constitution first and foremost "bestow[s] rights on people and
persons, and [holds] itself out as bound by certain standards of
conduct in its relations with people and persons, not with some legal
construct called citizen."0 5
B. Membership Rights
Citizenship is man's basic right for it is nothing less
30 6
than the right to have rights.
Rights also connote membership--"rights imply a respect that
places one in the referential range of self and others, that elevates
one's status from human body to social being."30 7 Communitarian
theorists urge that individual rights cannot be understood outside the
context of community; rights are constituted in the context of
belonging.0 ' From at least the time of ancient Rome, rights have both
signified and stemmed from membership.3 9 Today, membership
rights from country clubs to advanced economies are desired and
contested, so much so that Michael Walzer has observed that "[t]he
primary good that we distribute to one another is membership in
'
some human community. 310
If eighteenth-century social contract theory was a source for
rights of personhood, it also gave rise to influential protocommunitarian theories of rights. In contrast to Locke, Jean Jacques
Rousseau did not believe that the origin of rights was in nature; he
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located it in "the social order."13 1 Although Locke believed that free
persons retained a sphere of natural rights free from governmental
interference, Rousseau's social compact entails complete alienation of
each individual's rights to the collective whole, creating a new sphere
of collective rights, owned and expressed by "the People," each of
whom individually were "citizens. 3 12 Rights for Rousseau were by
definition membership rights, arising out of social, reciprocal
obligations, and expressed through the political process.
It is exactly because rights connote membership that they
matter for many at the margins of society. As Professor Kenneth
Karst remarked, "The rhetoric of rights is vital to a cultural minority
in defending the values of belonging, whether the concern be for
313
group solidarity or for integration into the larger society." Yet this
empowering feature of membership rights is exactly what makes
them dangerous. Just as rights of personhood are partly framed by a
binary relationship of persons to things, members have rights of
membership via their relationship with non-members. Rights in this
sense are often perceived as a zero-sum game; the extension of rights
to new members might be considered a dilution just as much as
an expansion. 4
C. Non-Persons and Non-Members
Communitarians and liberals may not agree about the source
of rights, but both perspectives hold that rights are valuable.
Rights holders are persons who command respect in their
relationship with other persons and the state. They are also members
of "the people" who may lay claim to membership rights from voting
to public benefits.
The shift from the Burger Court's equal protection
jurisprudence to the contemporary Court's focus on federalism and
agency skepticism represents a net loss of prestige for non-citizens.
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Within the panoply of American rights, few resonate more with the
public than the right to equal protection, which was enacted to assure
that freed slaves were granted full societal membership rights after
the Civil War.3" 5 The clause has since been interpreted as a means for
overcoming the shortfalls of representational democracy by protecting
"discrete and insular" minorities. 16 But rather than confirming the
membership status of non-citizens, cases like Arizona v. United States
uphold the rights of the federal government over immigrants. And
administrative law is at least as focused on assuring agency
accountability to the democratic majority as it is on protecting the
rights of persons caught up in agency processes.317
Preemption analysis and the APA are similar in the sense
that immigrants are incidental beneficiaries rather than subjects in
their own right. Preemption affirms the power of the federal
government over immigrants; the APA affirms the power of courts
over agencies. In both cases, immigrants are subordinate.
Rights are not only important for the prestige and protection
of immigrants; they also matter for society. Both liberals and
communitarians agree, albeit for different reasons, that a just society
requires a more or less equal distribution of rights. For example, John
Rawls argued that liberty is a social value, which, like economic
opportunity, should be distributed equally unless an unequal
distribution is to everyone's benefit.1 ' Based on Rawls's social
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contract theory, Professor Ronald Dworkin argues that all persons
319
have a "right to equal concern and respect." By this he means not
that all persons have a right to equal treatment, but that all persons
32
have a right to be treated as equals. ' Thus, more liberties may be
apportioned to some persons than others only if the principle of
allocation does not treat any person as worthy of less respect
than others.
One might argue that sovereignty is a neutral principle that
rational non-citizens themselves might choose as a reason for unequal
treatment in cases where it is necessary to protect national
sovereignty. Thus, despite Rawls and Dworkin's strong defense of
equality, a liberal argument might be made for restricting some
non-citizen rights, likely those that seem most obviously related to
membership, such as voting and certain types of governmental
employment. But the sovereignty argument weakens when core
rights of personhood are at issue.
This liberal argument for restricting rights dovetails with
prominent
most
of the
One
arguments.
communitarian
favor of
in
written
communitarian thinkers, Michael Walzer, has
rigid control at the border, since he believes that communities must
32
be allowed to define themselves. ' But he is clear that this form of
control should not intrude on the life of the interior:
The determination of aliens and guests by an
exclusive band of citizens (or of slaves by masters, or
women by men, or blacks by whites, or conquered
peoples by their conquerors) is not communal freedom
but oppression. The citizens are free, of course, to set
up a club, make membership as exclusive as they like,
write a constitution, and govern one another. But they
can't claim territorial jurisdiction and rule over the
people with whom they share the territory. To do this
is to act outside their sphere, beyond their rights. It
is a form of tyranny. Indeed, the rule of citizens
over non-citizens, of members over strangers,
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is probably the most common form of tyranny in
human history.322
Walzer's concern with the mistreatment of non-citizens stems
from his ideas about equality. He argues in favor of "complex
equality," meaning that persons should be free to achieve monopoly,
or supremacy within a particular "sphere," like politics or wealth, but
no monopoly should extend across spheres. Thus, wealth should not
allow somebody to buy political power, and a nation's authority over
the border should not entitle it to deny non-citizens rights unrelated
323
to the national project of self-definition.
In fact, some communitarians have argued that weakening
non-citizens' rights can actually undermine community. As Professor
Linda Bosniak has pointed out, the exploitability of undocumented
workers makes them attractive to some employers, thus creating
employment opportunities that induce new non-citizens to enter
illegally.324 Although there are many aspects to the intractable cycle
of unauthorized immigration, one solution is to assure that
unauthorized migrants' rights are protected.
At the end of the day, rights protect. The Critical Race
Studies scholars persuasively argued that rights are political
resources and signifiers of worth. 325 Liberals and communitarians
might debate the source of rights-personhood or membership-but
from a functional perspective, rights signal both, and in a society that
values both autonomy and community, both are essential.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Equal Protection Clause was a favorite tool of the Burger
Court, which used it to strike down legislation restricting immigrants'
access to state services in all cases except those implicating a political
function. This exception is counter-textual, since the provision refers
to "persons," but in the political function cases, the Court seemed to
read "persons" as "the People." Despite the Equal Protection Clause's
universal language, U.S. courts have never interpreted it as a
mandate that all persons be treated equally in all circumstances.
Courts have always looked at the party being discriminated against,
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the issues at stake, and the justification for the disparate treatment.
It is perhaps inevitable that principles of membership will filter into
this analysis. Indeed, the history of the Fourteenth Amendment
shows that it has always been a right that is deeply embedded in
notions of membership. It was passed to remedy the subordination of
slaves, but it has been the gateway into the mainstream of American
political life for women, and racial and sexual minorities. It is a
means of safeguarding "discrete and insular minorities" from the
ominous side of democratic politics: majoritarian tyranny.
In this context, the Burger Court's many decisions upholding
immigrant equal protection rights sent a powerful signal that
non-citizens were members. In the years since, the Court has
continued to issue important opinions in non-citizens' favor. Notably,
the Rehnquist Court found that the government cannot indefinitely
detain non-citizens,32 6 and the Roberts Court has held that they
are entitled under the Sixth Amendment to attorney advice
3 27
concerning the deportation consequences of a criminal conviction.
The contemporary Court remains committed in criminal and
quasi-criminal matters to non-citizens' core rights of personhood.
But it has not affirmed what the Burger Court often held-that
non-citizens are entitled to equal protection when the government
discriminates against them in allocating the benefits of membership.
Instead, the Court has struck down discriminatory state
legislation based on the logic of preemption, and has reined in agency
action through the APA. Agency skepticism and federalism are
substitutes for equal protection with very different implications.
Federalism is about power-the power of the federal government over
states, and in the immigration context, over non-citizens. The APA is
a tool for asserting judicial power over agencies and, by assuring that
agencies do not exceed their legislative mandate, the power of the
democratic majority over unelected bureaucrats. Unlike the Equal
Protection Clause, which is a means for safeguarding the rights of
the few, the APA is in large part about agency accountability to
the majority.
The shift away from immigrant equal protection may be part
of a larger shift away from recognizing non-citizens as members. In
the nineteenth and early twentieth century, European immigrants
were on a presumed pathway to citizenship, and enjoyed much
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broader political participation rights than today. The racialized
distinctions of the nineteenth and early twentieth century have now
given way to a complex hierarchy of immigration statuses, with
Lawful Permanent Residents on the top and undocumented
immigrants at the bottom. LPR status is difficult to obtain, and
although LPRs have greater membership rights than other
immigrants, they have less than the intending citizens of an earlier
era. Moreover, as the boundary for members has narrowed, the scope
of membership rights has increased. Rights like the rights to work
and free speech were once assumed to belong to everyone; today they
are sometimes restricted to LPRs or other privileged immigrants.
The dissipating membership rights of immigrants means that
they must rely more on the exercise of federal or state discretion in
their favor. This reliance, however, may place non-citizens in danger.
The APA could be used by anti-immigrant organizations to attack
federal programs that benefit non-citizens, like the DACA initiative,
just as industry groups have successfully challenged environmental
legislation. Conversely, states that have more generous policies
toward non-citizens than the federal government could face federal
preemption challenges that are the mirror image of Arizona.
History teaches that majoritarian tyranny is a real threat to
immigrants, who are poorly protected by the political process. The
federal
government's
immigration
policies
will
shift
as
administrations and priorities change, and the beneficent policies of
today may give way to draconian ones tomorrow. Meanwhile,
Congress seems to lack the will to create a comprehensive and
coherent immigration law. Congressional inertia is feeding public
frustration with the immigration system, meaning that states and
localities are increasingly taking matters into their own hands,
passing laws like Arizona's SB 1070. Arizona v. United States will not
spell the end to this conflict, and if the only boundaries to it are the
principles of federalism, states will not lose every battle.
The Equal Protection Clause is an important shield against
majoritarian abuse, yet for non-citizens, it seems less reliable today
than in times past. This is not to say that the Court fails entirely to
protect non-citizens' rights. Cases like Padilla v. Kentucky and
Zadvydas v. Davis uphold important procedural rights for noncitizens facing deportation. Even Arizona recognizes that the
prolonged detention of non-citizens as part of an investigation into
their status could be constitutionally problematic. For that matter,
Judulang v. Holder and the asylum jurisprudence of Judge Posner
could be read as being about more than just agency rationality; they
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might also be invoked for a principle of procedural fairness that is
light years beyond the level of due process that the early Court
recognized in cases like Yamataya v. Fisher.
If there is a direction that can be intuited from the Court's
circuitous immigrant rights jurisprudence, it seems towards
procedural due process and away from membership rights. The Court
respects core rights of personhood when non-citizens are on the verge
of serious harm-indefinite detention, deportation based on
ineffective assistance of counsel, or a fundamentally unfair hearing.
Upholding basic procedural rights within the context of a sometimes
Kafkaesque deportation process is an important role for a Court. But
this is rights protection at the eleventh hour-when non-citizens are
already halfway out the door.
Immigrants have always been liminal figures in American
constitutionalism: persons, for purposes of core due process and
(most) criminal procedural rights, but only partly members of "the
People" when it comes to public benefits or political participation. The
debate over how to allocate membership rights to immigrants is
a difficult one, which partly turns on their characterization.
At different times in U.S. history, non-citizens have been putative,
transitional, potential or non-members. Sometimes they have
been "guests," but rarely welcome ones. All too often, they have been
called invaders, as Justice Scalia described unauthorized migrants
in Arizona.3 2 8
In this climate, perhaps the best that can be hoped is for
immigrants to invoke individual rights proxies like federalism or
agency skepticism. But history, even U.S. legal history, is full of
sudden change. The contemporary Supreme Court may prioritize
structural rights based on federalism over individual rights and
administrative law claims over constitutional ones. But these
currently prevailing doctrines evolved from a very different state of
affairs-one in which immigrants succeeded to a remarkable extent
in pressing claims as equals.
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